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Insurance Regulation in Alaska:
Healthy Exercise of a State Prerogative
DAVID G. STEBING*
This article provides a general overview of the evolution of
insurance regulation as a state function, focusing primarily on
Alaska's regulatory scheme The article begins by tracing the
development of state insurance regulation,from its beginnings in
the early nineteenth century to Congress's passage of the
McCarran-FergusonAct over one hundredyears later. The article
then examines the successes and failures of state regulation and
discusses attempts at, and the potential for, significant federal
involvement in insurance regulation. Against this backdrop, the
article provides a detailed discussion of insurance regulation in
Alaska from territorial days to the present, with particular
emphasis on the current statutory framework.

I.

INTRODUCTION

Throughout history, social and economic institutions as well as
religion itself have provided security to people against the uncertainty of loss.' For most people today, however, insurance has
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1. Historically, individuals facing loss or hardship relied on the largess of
community or kinship ties. It has been suggested that the capitalist revolution
which supplanted feudal society in Western Europe also destroyed this community
support structure. See Spencer L. Kimball, The Purpose of Insurance Regulation:
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replaced these methods. Due to the great potential for fraud and
abuse in the insurance industry, and the insurance industry's
importance in providing social and economic security,2 the government has sought to regulate the activities of insurers.
Alaskan insurance consumers have yet to experience the
impact of large scale insurance fraud.3 Nevertheless, in the past
few years, isolated instances of insurance fraud have abounded,
including situations in which commercial fishermen have paid
premiums for insurance that they learned did not exist after their
vessels sank; agents have accepted and absconded with insurance
premiums without securing coverage; brokers have wrongfully
refused to return insurance premiums to insureds after their policies
were cancelled, instead using the monies for personal gain;

A PreliminaryInquiry in the Theory of Insurance Law, 45 MINN. L. REV. 471,480
(1961). The International Red Cross, church-sponsored organizations and
government relief programs are examples of contemporary, non-obligatory means
of alleviating loss resulting from catastrophes.
2. Commentators have noted that "[t]he underlying reason for insurance
regulation is to protect the public from incompetent and fraudulent insurers." R.
MEHR ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF INSURANCE 714 (1980); see also Northern Adjusters,
Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 627 P.2d 205,207 (Alaska 1981) (stating that the
insurance code was enacted to "protect the Alaskan insurance consumer").
Consumers are vulnerable not only to fraud, but to an inequity in bargaining
power and the fact that insurance policies are drafted by the insurer on a "take it
or leave it" basis. This acknowledged inequity remains a fundamental part of
insurance law. See, e.g., 13 JOHN A. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACrCE

§ 7401, at 211 (1976); Whispering Creek Condominium Owner Ass'n v. Alaska
Nat'l Ins. Co., 774 P.2d 176, 177-78 n.1 (Alaska 1989). In addition, states have a
strong interest in regulating unfair claims settlement practices, see ALASKA STAT.
§ 21.36.125 (1993); ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 3, §§ 26.010-.300 (July 1993), and
unfair business practices such as (1) rebating, see generally ALASKA STAT.
§§ 21.36.100, 21.36.120 (1993); (2) twisting (that is, fraudulently inducing an
insured to change insurance companies), see id. § 21.36.050; (3) misrepresentation,
see id §§ 21.36.030, 21.36.040; and (4) discrimination, see id. §§ 21.36.090,
21.36.120, 21.84.480.
3. There have been some close calls. Circumstances surrounding one insurer's
recent denial of admission to transact insurance business in Alaska illustrate the
need for regulatory oversight. The owners of an insurance company purchased it
from themselves with the company's own money, including use of an assignment
of ownership in worthless property. Predictably, the company later became
insolvent and was liquidated in Utah. And, in a remarkable example of fraud, in
1993 another insurer attempting to sell insurance to Alaskan chiropractors
represented that it was domiciled in an island country in the Pacific named The
Federal Republic of Corterra-a country which was later determined not to exist.
The company was ordered to cease and desist transacting business in Alaska.
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unlicensed agents and brokers have sold insurance policies to
unwary customers to take advantage of the fleeting opportunity to

earn commissions; and producers have issued certificates of
insurance to potential claimants for non-existent coverage. In this

complex financial services industry, the threat to consumers is real.
There is a clear need for an insurance regulatory agency that can

not only respond quickly to perceived problems but can take
actions to prevent such abuses.
Such regulation is necessary, in large part, because of the

pervasive impact the insurance industry has on our society. On an
individual level, people need insurance for their cars, health, homes
and businesses,4 and most states mandate insurance for workers'
compensation and financial responsibility for automobile liability.5
Consisting of more than 5000 insurers nationwide, by 1989 the
insurance industry administered assets of more than $1.8 trillion.6
Insurance companies and related service industries, including
brokers, agents and adjusters, employ nearly 2.5 million persons.7
The insurance industry accounts for nearly $100 billion of the gross
national product ("GNP") of the United States, with insurance
premiums alone accounting for more than seven percent of the

GNP. In 1991, state insurance regulatory agencies collected $8.1
billion in revenues, ninety-one percent of which came from taxes
on the insurance industry.9

4. In 1989, more than 95% of all homeowners had household insurance,
approximately 85% of all automobile owners had automobile insurance and
roughly 70% of the population possessed some type of life insurance. ARTHUR
ANDERSEN & Co., THE INSURANCE INDUSTRY 3 (1991). Insurance expenditures

account for 5.8% of all spending by American households. BRUAN W. SMrrH,
ALLIANCE OF AmERICAN INSURERS, THE INSURANCE INDUSTRY: A KEY PLAYER
IN THE U.S. ECONOMY I (4th ed. 1992).
5. E.g., ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.075 (1990) (workers compensation); id.
§ 28.22.011 (1989 & Supp. 1992) (financial responsibility for motor vehicles).
6. ARTHUR ANDERSEN & Co., supra note 4, at 1. Assets administered by
United States life insurance companies nearly tripled between 1981 and 1991.
7. UNITED STATES DEP'T OF COM., STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED
STATES 407, 494 (1992). According to the Alliance of American Insurers
("AAI"), Alaska, with 1800 employees in the insurance industry, is second only
to Wyoming as the state with the fewest individuals employed in this field. SMITH,
supra note 4, at 12.
8. See U.S. DEP'T OF COM., 1991 SURVEY OF CURRENT BUSINESs 27.
9. NATIONAL Ass'N OF INS. COMM'RS, SPECIAL RESEARCH REPORT 3
(1993). Recently in Alaska, over $1.8 billion in annual insurance premiums was
collected for admitted insurance, and over $43 million was collected for surplus
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Many of the largest corporations in America are insurance
entities,1" typically organized as holding companies for a diverse
array of insurance products, leading one recent congressional report
to declare that "[t]he business of insurance in the United States is,
clearly, big business... [A]lmost every American, in one way or

another, is touched by the industry's impact upon our economy.""
Insurance companies sell a unique and important product that is of
critical importance to world commerce as well as to the security of
businesses and individuals. 2 One uninsured loss can devastate an
otherwise successful business, and life and health insurance provide
needed financial security in the case of death or sickness in the

lines insurance premiums. In addition, more than 1050 insurers have been
admitted to transact business, and more than 6,000 licenses for agents, brokers and
adjusters have been obtained through the Division of Insurance. ALASKA DEP'T

OF COM. AND ECON. DEV., Div. OF INS., 54TH ANNUAL REPORT 3, 18 (1992).
In 1992, allocated loss adjustment expenses for admitted insurers in Alaska alone
exceeded $52 million, a large portion of which was paid to appointed insurance
defense counsel. ALASKA Div. OF INS., 1992 DIRECr ALLOCATED Loss
ADJUSTMENT EXPENSES INCURRED 1.

10. As of December 31, 1991, the largest American life-health insurers by
admitted assets were: (1) Prudential Insurance Company of America ($148 billion);
(2) Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. ($110 billion); (3) Teachers Insurance and
Annuity Association ($55 billion); and (4) Aetna Life Insurance Co. ($52 billion).
New York Life Insurance Company, a major player in Alaska, was sixth with
assets of $42 billion. Leaders by Category, BEST'S REV., July 1992, at 2.
As of December 31, 1991, the largest property-casualty insurers by admitted
assets were: (1) State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. ($42.6 billion); (2)
Travelers Insurance Co. ($35.6 billion); and (3) Allstate Insurance Co. ($23.7
billion). See BEST'S INSURANCE REPORTS, PROPERTY-CASUALTY xxiv - xxvii

(1992).
"Admitted assets" is a term of art in the insurance industry, referring to the
assets state regulators consider in measuring an insurer's solvency. See generally
MEHR ET AL., supra note 2, at 747-48; ALASKA STAT. §§ 21.18.010, 21.18.900(1),
(6) & (8) (1993).
11. SENATE PERMANENT SUBCOMM. OF THE COMM. ON GOVERNMENTAL
AFFAIRS, SECOND INTERIM REPORT ON U.S. GOVERNMENT EFFORTS TO
COMBAT FRAUD AND ABUSE IN THE INSURANCE INDUSTRY: PROBLEMS WITH
THE REGULATION OF THE INSURANCE AND REINSURANCE INDUSTRY, S. REP.

No. 310, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1992).
12. Insurance companies have been described as quasi-public financial
institutions whose regulation is essential not only to protect policyholders, but also
to maintain stability in domestic and foreign financial markets. See EDWARD B.
RAPPAPORT, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, CRS REPORT FOR
CONGRESS: INSURANCE COMPANY INSOLVENCY 1 (1989).
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family. Clearly, the insurance industry provides a vital service
which has a pervasive influence on American life.
In essence, insurance is a promise to pay all or part of the
costs associated with some future event, in consideration for the
payment of premiums by a policyholder in advance of the event. 3
The simplicity of the insurance concept, however, contrasts with the
extreme complexity of its implementation. 4 Among other things,
insurers must successfully choose which risks to insure, decide what
types of insurance to market, determine the proper premium,
manage and invest the premium funds, share risks through
reinsurance, establish adequate reserves, handle claims and provide
quality customer service.

6

With annual premium income in the billions and outstanding
contracts affecting millions of people in every phase of American
business and society, insurance clearly affects the public interest

13. Insurance is aleatory in nature-that is, a central condition of the contract
is an uncertain event. See Wade Oilfield Serv. Co. v. Providence Washington Ins.
Co. of Alaska, 759 P.2d 1302, 1307 (Alaska 1988). Where the uncertain event
does not materialize, the insured's premium payments are not recovered, resulting
in profit for the insurer. On the other hand, if the event does occur, the insurer
may pay an amount much larger than the sum of the premiums it has collected.
Thus, insurance is often compared to gambling, and the Anglo-American values
and public policies in recent centuries reflecting disdain for gambling contracts
impacted the insurance institution, creating the doctrine of insurable interest to
distinguish permissible contracts of insurance from illegal wagers. See EDWIN W.
PATrERSON, CASES ON THE LAW OF INSURANCE 112-14 (3d ed. 1955). See also
ALASKA STAT. § 21.42.030 (1993) (requiring an insurable interest in property
insured).
14. It has been stated that "few fields match in complexity that of the
regulation of insurance." JOHN G. DAY, ECONOMIc REGULATION OF INSURANCE
IN THE UNITED STATES iii (1970).
15. Although insurers market well over 50 types of insurance, most insurance
can be classified generally as either first-party or third-party insurance. The
former protects the insured for direct loss, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 804 (6th
ed. 1990), whereas the latter protects the insured for liability arising from damages
to third parties. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Nicholson, 777 P.2d 1152,1154
n.2 (Alaska 1989) (citing W. SHERNOFF ET AL., INSURANCE BAD FAITH
LITIGATION

§ 3.01, at 3-3 (1987)).

16. A study suggests that auto and home insurance lines, two of the most
prevalent types of insurance in our society, can increase profits 81% by increasing
customer retention rates a mere 5%. See P. Haapaniemi, Making 'Good Things
Happen,' SOLUTIONS, Spring 1993, at 10. Hence, customer satisfaction with the
insurance claims process is very important.
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and is an industry that requires regulation." Both the United
States Supreme Court and Congress have recognized this need. In
a 1914 case, the Court declared that "the business of insurance so
far affects the public welfare as to invoke and require governmental
regulation.""8 Subsequent judicial decisions have determined that
insurance regulation falls within state police powers.19 In addition,
in 1945 Congress passed the McCarran-Ferguson Act, ° which
formally recognized the states' power to regulate insurance,
declaring that "the continued regulation and taxation by the several
States of the business of insurance is in the public interest, and that
silence on the part of the Congress shall not be construed to
impose any barrier to the regulation or taxation of such business by
the several States."'" Because of this long-standing relation
between the insurance industry and the public interest, the industry

17. For the purpose of this article, insurance regulation contemplates control
over all aspects of the insurance industry through legislation, judicial decisions or
administrative activity of a state insurance regulatory agency, its employees and
officers. This includes, but is not limited to, the oversight of insurance companies,
agents, brokers, solicitors, and adjusters.
18. German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 233 U.S. 389, 412 (1914). The Court
went on to state:
[I]t may be enough to say, without stating other effects of insurance, that
a large part of the country's wealth, subject to uncertainty of loss through
fire, is protected by insurance. This demonstrates the interest of the
Contracts of insurance, therefore, have greater public
public in it ....
consequence than contracts between individuals to do or not to do a
particular thing whose effect stops with the individuals.
Id. at 413.
19. See Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. N.O. Nelson Mfg. Co., 291 U.S.
352,360 (1934) ("The business of insurance is one peculiarly subject to supervision
and control."); Burstein v. State Bar of Cal., 693 F.2d 511, 522 (5th Cir. 1982)
("Insurance is, of course, an industry traditionally highly regulated by the state.");
Chicago Title Ins. Co. v. Huff, 256 N.W.2d 17, 29 (Iowa 1977) ("[T]his court has
long recognized the insurance business is peculiarly subject to special supervision
and control."); Bankers Life & Casualty Co. v. Alexander, 45 N.W.2d 258, 263
(Iowa 1950) ("Statutes which regulate the insurance business are remedial in
character, enacted under the state's police power upon the theory the business is
impressed with a public interest and the public is entitled to protection against
illegal practices.").
20. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (1988).
21. Id. § 1011. Although a territory at the time the statute was enacted,
Alaska was included within the definition of "State." Id. § 1015.
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has evolved into one of the more highly regulated business
activities in the country.'
The purpose of this article is to provide a general overview of

the national evolution of insurance regulation, focusing on Alaska's
current regulatory scheme, recent developments in the insurance
field which may affect Alaskans and a description of the enforcement powers of Alaska's Division of Insurance. Section II provides
an historical overview of insurance regulation in the United States.
Section III discusses the McCarran-Ferguson Act and its effect on
state regulation, as well as attempts at federal regulation. The
article concludes with section IV, which provides a detailed
discussion of insurance regulation in Alaska from territorial days to
the present, including a brief description of Alaska's administrative
and enforcement mechanisms. While a survey of this nature cannot
speak to all issues that comprise the vast universe of insurance
regulation, this article's primary objective is to give the reader a
general understanding of insurance regulation with an emphasis on
the evolution of Alaska's regulatory scheme.
II. AN HISTORICAL VIEW OF INSURANCE REGULATION IN THE
UNITED STATES

Insurance regulation began as a state function. The right of

the states to charter corporations facilitated early state regulation
of insurance companies. Initially, state regulation emphasized the
taxation of insurance premiums and insurance stock.' New York

22. A well-known commentator on insurance regulation has stated:
As insurance became widespread, it involved the transfer, and in its
more sophisticated forms the accumulation, of substantial amounts of
liquid capital. In the twentieth century, assets of insurance companies
and similar financial institutions became large in relation to the total
wealth of the nation, and came to have a large impact on the process of
capital formation and the capital structure of enterprise.
SPENCER L. KIMBALL, INSURANCE AND PUBLIC POLICY 250 (1960). Recently, the
financial health of insurers has become a national concern:
As the decade of the 1980's ended, the American public and the
insurance industry were slowly emerging from a period in which
consumer confidence in the nation's financial system had substantially
eroded. Confidence in financial institutions had been shaken by the
savings & loan debacle, Wall Street scandals, the collapse of the real
estate market, and the heightened visibility of insurance company
insolvencies-notably among property/casualty insurers.
A.M. BEST Co., SPECIAL REPORT, BEST'S INSOLVENCY STUDY 1 (1992).
23. The power of states to tax insurers is expressly recognized in the
McCarran-Ferguson Act. See supra text accompanying note 21.
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instituted the first premium tax in 1824,24 and Connecticut imposed a tax on insurance stock in 1830.' While the revenue from
premium taxes was originally imposed in part to help defray
regulation expenses, today, state insurance regulatory agencies
actually use only a small portion of such revenue, 6 reserving the
vast majority for other state services.7
With the exception of reporting requirements, which
insurance companies were subject to under a state's corporations
code,29 insurers in the first half of the nineteenth century remained essentially self-regulating. As the complexity of regulation
increased, however, states recognized that regulators with expertise
in insurance were necessary. Eventually, they formed separate
state offices or agencies to deal with insurance regulation. In 1851
New Hampshire became the first state to create a full-time Board
of Insurance Commissioners." That same year, New York began
requiring all insurers to provide security deposits with the state and

24. Act of Nov. 19, 1824, ch. 277, 1822-1824 N.Y. Laws 340.
25. Act of June 4,1830, ch. 28,1830 Conn. Pub. Acts 305-06. Today, all states
derive substantial revenue from taxing the insurance industry. For example, in
1991 California and Texas collected approximately $1.2 billion and $555 million
in premium and retaliatory taxes respectively. NATIONAL ASS'N OF INS.
COMM'RS, 1991 INSURANCE DEPARTMENT RESOURCES REPORT 23 [hereinafter

1991 NAIC RESOURCES REP.]. In 1992, the Alaska Division of Insurance
collected over $26 million in insurance premium taxes. ALASKA DEP'T OF COM.,
AND ECON. DEv., Div. OF INS., 55TH ANNUAL REPORT 1 (1993).

1991 NAIC RESOURCES REP., supra note 25, at 24-25.
MEHR ET AL., supra note 2, at 763.
See Linda Lamel, State Regulation of the Insurance Industry, INS. L.J. 336
In her introduction, Lamel explained:
State regulation of insurance did not begin as regulation of insurance
per se. As the United States moved into its own national development,
the corporate charters issued in Europe disappeared and a United States
system for chartering and licensing corporations emerged. New York was
the first to enact legislation affecting 'monied corporations,' which
required them to file sworn financial statements with the state comptroller.

26.
27.
28.
(1978).

Id.
29. "While these early reporting requirements were for administrative purposes
only, they later provided a useful precedent for obtaining the more extensive
information deemed necessary for responsible regulation." DAY, supra note 14,
at 5.
30. Act of July 5, 1851, ch. 1111, 1851 N.H. LAWS 1072. The basic components
of New Hampshire's first law, including procedures for examining and investigating
insurers, can be found in most state insurance codes today, including Alaska's.
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life insurers to complete an annual questionnaire.3 ' Massachusetts32 and Vermont33 created insurance commissions in 1852, and
Massachusetts created a full-time position for an insurance
regulator in 1855.4 The early insurance commissioners initially
focused on obtaining financial data in order to monitor the
solvency35 of insurers. 36 By 1900, thirteen states had separate
insurance 7departments; by 1918, the number had increased to
thirty-six?
The courts have also played a significant role in the development of state insurance regulation. In Paul v. Virginia,8 a seminal
case regarding insurance regulation, the United States Supreme
Court decided that the regulation of insurance contracts fell outside
the jurisdiction of the federal government. Paul involved a
challenge by several New York insurance companies to Virginia's
requirement that fire insurance companies purchase and file bonds
for the protection of policyholders residing in the state. The Court
approved Virginia's regulatory action, holding that the issuance of
insurance policies "is not a transaction of commerce" and hence
does not fall within the province of the Commerce Clause of the
United States Constitution.39

31. Act of Apr. 8, 1851, ch. 95, 1851 N.Y. Laws 167. Today, all states require
authorized insurers to post a statutory deposit. E.g. ALASKA STAT. § 21.09.090
(1993).
32. Act of May 22, 1852, ch. 311, 1852 Mass. Acts 166.
33. Act of Nov. 23, 1852, ch. 45, 1852 Vt. Laws 46; Act of Nov. 23, 1852, ch.
46, 1852 Vt. Laws 51-52 (state officers appointed ex-officio members of Board of
Insurance Commissioners).
34. Act of Mar. 31, 1855, ch. 124, 1855 Mass. Acts 569.
35. The issue of insurer solvency has been a driving force behind the continued
development of insurance regulation. See DAY, supra note 14, at 2; see also
ALASKA STAT. § 21.90.900(21) (1993) (definition of insolvency in insurance
context).
36. Lamel, supra note 28, at 337. Today, insurance commissioners, and the
agencies they lead, wield tremendous policy-making power. One commentator has
characterized the California Department of Insurance as a "powerhouse" of the
same stature as the Public Utilities Commission and the California Environmental
Protection Agency. L. Harold Levinson, The CaliforniaRegulatoryLaw Reporter,
ADMnN. L. NEWS 8, 8-9 (1993).
37. DAY, supra note 14, at 10.
38. 75 U.S. (8 Wal.) 168 (1868).
39. Id at 183 (Insurance "policies are simply contracts ... not articles of
commerce.").
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In 1871, a few years after the Court's Paul decision, New
York's Superintendent of Insurance invited insurance commissioners of all states to meet in an effort to achieve uniformity in annual
The meeting
statements, examination practices and laws.4"
resulted in the formation of the National Convention of Insurance
Commissioners, which in 1936 became the National Association of
Insurance Commissioners ("NAIC")." Since its inception, this
organization has played an increasingly important role in providing
a forum for the exchange of ideas and formulation of uniform
insurance regulation policy.4'

40. MEHi ET AL, supra note 2, at 723. The annual statement

of financial

information which insurance companies are required to file in states where they
do business, as well as with the NAIC, see infra note 41, is a powerful tool for the
promotion of uniform regulation of insurers.
41. The NAIC is an association comprised of the chief insurance regulatory
officials of the states, U.S. territories and insular possessions. The NAIC has three
express regulatory objectives:
(1) Promotion of the public interest through the regulation of insurance
and the fair, just and equitable treatment of insurance consumers and
claimants;
(2) Reliability of the insurance institution as to solvency, financial
solidity and guaranty against loss; and
(3) Maintenance and improvement of State regulation of insurance in a
responsive and efficient manner.
See NAIC Strategic Plan 1993-97, Mission Statement, NAIC NEWS (Nat'l Ass'n of
Ins. Comm'rs, Kansas City, Mo.), July 1993, at 14. Throughout its history, the
NAIC has provided valuable national leadership in regulating the insurance
industry. See generally NAIC Model Law Process: Hearingson the Nat'l Ass'n of
Ins. Comm'rs Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust, Monopolies, and Business Rights
of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) (statement of
Hon. Earl Pomeroy) [hereinafter Hearings on NAIC Model Law Process]. Over
the years, the NAIC developed the predecessor to the annual statement blank to
provide a means for uniform financial reporting; established the Securities
Valuation Office ("SVO") to assist insurers in valuing securities; approved the
Uniform Insurers Liquidation Act in response to the forced liquidation and
reorganization of insurance companies during the Great Depression; helped draft
the McCarran-Ferguson Act; introduced a model Unfair Trade Practices Act,
which has since been adopted by all states; and more recently has pressed
Congress to address white collar insurance fraud and lobbied for a national
program of financial regulation standards.
42. The NAIC has developed more than 200 model laws to meet the needs of
state regulators. HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations
of the House of RepresentativesComm. on Energy and Com. 102d Cong., 1st Sess.
44 (1991) (statement of Richard L. Fogel) [hereinafter Hearings];MODEL LAWS,
REGULATIONS AND GUIDELINES (Nat'l Ass'n of Ins. Comm'rs 1993) [hereinafter
NAIC MODEL LAws]. When a regulatory need is recognized, the NAIC
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For nearly seventy-five years after the NAIC's emergence,
state insurance regulatory practices developed without significant
interference from the federal government.43 In 1944, however, the
Supreme Court reversed its Paul v. Virginia position, holding in
United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n" that the
business of insurance does impact interstate commerce and,
therefore, is subject to federal control under the Commerce Clause
and antitrust laws.45 Because "[n]o commercial enterprise of any
kind which conducts its activities across state lines has been held to
be wholly beyond the regulatory power of Congress under the
Commerce Clause," the Court reasoned that it could not "make an
This decision raised
exception of the business of insurance."'
serious doubts about the power of states to regulate insurance and
caused considerable turmoil for both insurance industry members
and state regulators.47 Seeking to maintain the states' position as
the industry's primary regulators, the NAIC and the insurance
industry joined forces to obtain a congressional remedy. Their
efforts paid off the following year when Congress passed the
McCarran-Ferguson Act.

committee or subcommittee with pertinent jurisdiction in the area examines the
issue, sometimes assigning this work to a task force or working group. These
bodies, comprised of state regulators, research the issue and hold hearings. A
draft model is typically left open for comment prior to any vote. Upon a majority
vote of the plenary session, a model is adopted by the NAIC. Hearings on NAIC
Model Law Process, supra note 41, at 1.
43. The principle of Paul v. Virginia, that the insurance industry was subject
to state regulation, was cited and reaffirmed by the Supreme Court no less than
twenty-two different times during this period. See Legislative ProposalSubmitted
to the Congress of the United States by the Executive Committee of the National
Association of Insurance Commissioners, NAIC PROC. (Nat'l Ass'n of Ins.
Comm'rs, Kansas City, Mo.), August 29,1944, at 44 [hereinafter NAIC Legislative
Proposal].
44. 322 U.S. 533 (1944).
45. Id. at 552-53.
46. Id. at 553.
47. ARTHUR ANDERSEN & Co., supra note 4, at 34. See also Report of the
Subcommittee on Federal Legislation to Executive Committee of National
Association of Insurance Commissioners, NAIC PROC. (Nat'l Ass'n of Ins.
Comm'rs, Kansas City, Mo.), August 29, 1944, at 43. It is interesting to note that
this subcommittee was appointed on October 7, 1943, prior to South-Eastern
Underwriters. See supra text accompanying note 44.
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III. THE MCCARRAN-FERGUSON ACT AND THE THREAT OF
FEDERAL REGULATION

Enacted in 1945, the McCarran-Ferguson Act expressly
declares that "continued regulation and taxation by the several
states of the business of insurance is in the public interest,"48
thereby reaffirming the states' long-standing right to tax insurers
and regulate in this area. Despite the Act's apparent simplicity and
brevity, the intended meaning of the words "business of insurance"
contained in the Act has been a fertile source of litigation and
scholarly comment.4 9 The McCarran-Ferguson Act also contains
language exempting insurance companies from antitrust laws,
excluding "any agreement to boycott, coerce, or intimidate, or act
of boycott, coercion, or intimidation."'5 Recent attempts to repeal
or modify the McCarran-Ferguson Act, including a bill introduced

48. 15 U.S.C. § 1011 (1988).
49. See generallyDavis Howard, Uncle Sam Versus the InsuranceCommissioners: A Multi-Level Approach to Defining the "Business of Insurance" Under the
McCarran-FergusonAct, 25 WILLAMETTE L. REv. 1 (1989); Eric P. Gillett,
Comment, The Business of Insurance: Exemption, Exemption, Who Has the
Antitrust Exemption?, 17 PAC. L.J. 261 (1985); Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v.
Royal Drug, 440 U.S. 205 (1979) (establishing a legal test for "business of
insurance"). Recently, the United States Supreme Court held that the process of
liquidating an insurer constitutes the business of insurance. See United States
Dep't of Treasury v. Fabe, 113 S.Ct. 2202 (1993) (recognizing the superiority of
insurance policyholder interests over the interests of the federal government in the
liquidation of an insolvent insurer).
It has been argued that Supreme Court decisions have emasculated the Act's
original intent by interpreting the phrase "business of insurance" in an unreasonably constrictive manner. See Spencer L. Kimball & Barbara P. Heaney,
Emasculation of the McCarran-FergusonAct: A Study in JudicialActivism, 1985
UTAH L. REV. 1, 58.
50. See 15 U.S.C. § 1013(b) (1988).
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this year,5' have frequently focused on the perceived inequity in
exempting insurance companies from antitrust laws.
Of the many cases interpreting the McCarran-Ferguson Act,
a recent one is particularly noteworthy. In June 1993, the United
States Supreme Court decided Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v.
California," a case in which nineteen states, including Alaska, and
fourteen private parties brought an antitrust action against thirtytwo defendants, primarily domestic and foreign insurers and
reinsurers, alleging that the defendants colluded in violation of the
law. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants had engaged in
various conspiracies aimed at forcing some primary insurers to
change the terms of their standard domestic commercial general
liability ("CGL")53 policies to conform to language in policies the
defendant insurers wanted to sell. The district court concluded that
the defendants were entitled to immunity under the antitrust
exemption contained in the McCarran-Ferguson Act and granted
the defendants' motion to dismiss.'
The court of appeals reversed, finding that (1) the foreign
reinsurers did not fall within the antitrust exemption because their
activities could not be "'regulated by State law' within the
meaning of the McCarran-Ferguson Act and (2) the domestic
insurers had forfeited their exemption by conspiring with the non-

51. See Insurance Competitive Pricing Act of 1993, H.R. 9, 103d Cong., 1st
Sess. (1993). Repeal of the antitrust exemption has long been sought by critics of
the insurance industry. During the past three sessions of Congress, Representative
Jack Brooks, chair of the House Judiciary Committee, has introduced legislation
to modify the antitrust exemption. See id.; see also H.R. 1663, 101st Cong., 2d
Sess. (1990). Senator Metzenbaum has introduced a similar bill in the past. See
S. 430, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991). See generally Charles D. Weller, The
McCarran-FergusonAct's Antitrust Exemption for Insurance: Language, History
and Policy, 1978 DUKE L.J. 587; Note, McCarran-FergusonImmunity, 105 HARV.
L. REV. 1414 (1992).
52. 113 S.Ct. 2891 (1993).
53. General liability insurance indemnifies businesses against third-party claims
for bodily injury or property damage. Most general liability insurance is written
on standardized CGL advisory policy forms developed by Insurance Services
Office, Inc. ("ISO"). ISO develops forms that comply with state requirements and
files them with the respective state insurance departments. See infra note 103.
ISO is a defendant in the HartfordFire case, and activities surrounding adoption
of its CGL forms are the focus of the case.
54. Hartford FireIns., 113 S.Ct. at 2899-2900.
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exempt foreign reinsurers.55 The court of appeals also held that
the defendants' conduct amounted to acts of "'boycott, coercion, or
intimidation"' and therefore fell outside the antitrust exemption. 6
In remanding the case after affirming and reversing in part, the
United States Supreme Court held that although the domestic
insurers did not lose their antitrust immunity by conspiring with
foreign reinsurers, the allegations of boycott were nevertheless
sufficient to defeat the motion to dismiss.'
Due to its potential for subjecting insurers to antitrust liability,
the Hartford Fire Insurance case has been characterized as "a
nuclear attack on the insurance industry."58 The Supreme Court,
in remanding the suit for reconsideration of the boycott allegations,
has made it easier for plaintiffs to bring to trial an antitrust action
against an insurer based on allegations of boycott. The Court's
decision should therefore bolster the cause of those seeking repeal
of the insurance industry's antitrust exemption.
Aside from its concerns over the antitrust exemption,
Congress's attention has recently focused on the alarming increase
in insurer insolvencies. In the years 1974-1980, an average of 6.9
insurers were liquidated each year, while the period 1981-1987 saw
that number nearly double to an average of 12.6 per year. 9 Over

55. Id. at 2900 (quoting In re Insurance Antitrust Litigation, 938 F.2d 919 (9th
Cir. 1991)).

56. Id.
57. Id. at 2903, 2916.
58. See Richard Carelli, Supreme Court Clears Way for Giant Insurance
Lawsuit, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, June 29, 1993, at C2.

See also Judy

Greenwald, Insurers See Victory in Antitrust Ruling, Bus. INS., July 5, 1993, at 1.
59. See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO THE CHAIRMAN,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, CONSUMER PROTECTION AND COMPETITIVENESS, OF THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, INSURANCE
REGULATION: PROBLEMS IN THE STATE MONITORING OF PROPERTY/CASUALTY
INSURER SOLVENCY 9 (1989). The threat of insurer insolvencies has long been a
concern. The Great Chicago Fire of 1871 resulted in 68 insurers going broke

under the weight of more than $100 million in claims. The San Francisco
Earthquake and Fire of 1906 resulted in over $500 million in losses with 12
American insurers going out of business. Some foreign insurers simply refused to
pay claims. D. MUSCATINE, OLD SAN FRANCISCO 430, 435 (1975).
More recently, estimated insured losses for Hurricane Andrew in 1992 are
nearly $23 billion, and Andrew has thus far resulted in eight insurer insolvencies.
Andrew claims another victim, BUS. INS., Mar. 8, 1993, at 70; 1992 cat loss total
soars with Andrew figures, Bus. INS., Mar. 1, 1993, at 2; F. Bayles, Insurance
industry put on storm alert, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, May 30, 1993, at G6.
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150 property-casualty companies became insolvent from 1969 to
1989, with nearly half of these insolvencies occurring between 19841989.60 A congressional report arising from an extensive investigation into the causes of insurance company failures is highly critical
of both the industry and its state regulators.61 Consequently, the
federal government is considering expanding its role in regulating
insurance, thereby raising questions regarding whether the
McCarran-Ferguson Act should be repealed, amended or left
undisturbed, and whether other remedial legislation should replace
it.
Congressman John Dingell recently introduced a bill to
substantially increase federal oversight over the problem of insurer
insolvency.6'
The Federal Insurance Solvency Act of 199363

Insurer insolvencies tend to follow catastrophic events. Notably, from 1987
to 1993 the insurance industry faced more losses resulting from catastrophes than
during the previous 20 years. G. Souter, Alternative market reacts to change, Bus.
INS., June 7, 1993, at 42.
60. SUBCOMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS OF THE HousE COMM.
ON ENERGY AND COM., FAILED PROMIsEs: REPORT ON INSURANCE COMPANY
INSOLVENCIES 2 (1990) [hereinafter FAILED PROMISES]. Congressman John
Dingell chaired the committee conducting the investigation.
61. The report describes certain individuals and activities in the insurance
industry as "scandalous management and rascality," "pirates and dolts,"
"scandalous behavior," "financial knaves and buccaneers" and "crooks, scoundrels
and incompetents." Id. at iii, 2-3.
62. Insurer insolvencies probably constitute the greatest threat to continued
state regulation, and congressional concern with the states' authority in this area
has long been a topic of consideration. In 1866 and 1868, prior to Paulv. Virginia,
bills were introduced in Congress to create a national bureau of insurance within
the Treasury Department. H.R. 738, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. (1866); S. 299, 40th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1868). Neither bill was enacted, and an 1892 bill to create a
federal commissioner of insurance also failed. H.R. 9629, 52d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1892). Even President Theodore Roosevelt twice suggested that Congress
consider regulating insurance. In declining to do so, Congress deferred to the
Supreme Court, accepting its Paul decision as the law of the land. See generally
Report of Subcommittee on FederalLegislationto Executive Committee of National
Association of Insurance Commissioners, NAIC PROC. (Nat'l Ass'n of Ins.
Comm'rs, Kansas City, Mo.), August 29, 1944, at 41. Turn-of-the-century legal
treatises joined the vigorous debate concerning federal regulation of insurance.
See, e.g., Carmen F. Randolph, Federal Supervision of Insurance, 5 COLuM. L.
REV. 500 (1905); I.M. Earle, Can Congress Regulate the Business ofInsurance?, 62
CENT. L.J. 28 (1906); John W. Walsh, National Supervision of Insurance and Paul
v. Virginia, 38 AM. L. REV. 181 (1904). Unsuccessful resolutions to amend the
Constitution in order to allow federal control over this area were introduced in
1914, 1915 and 1933. S.3. Res. 103, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. (1914); H.R.J. Res. 194,
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would create a joint system of federal/state regulation that would
enable insurers of any size to forego state regulation in favor of
seeking a federal solvency certificate issued by a newly-created
Federal Insurance Solvency Commission ("FISC"). Among other
things, the FISC would regulate the solvency and financial
condition of all federally licensed insurers and reinsurers and
develop rehabilitation and liquidation procedures for them;
establish a national guaranty fund; and create a federal entity to
regulate and license producers who do business in more than one
state. This bill, however, has been criticized as costly and inefficient,' and many parties are wary of greater federal involvement
due to the federal government's poor record in protecting the
public in other areas of financial services, such as the banking and
junk bond industries.65
63d Cong., 2d Sess. (1914); SJ. Res. 58, 64th Cong., 1st Sess. (1915); S.J. Res. 51,
73d Cong., 1st Sess. (1933). In 1958, Professor Kimball questioned "whether state
regulatory power over the insurance business is likely to continue, or whether
insurance will fall increasingly under the aegis of the federal government."
Spencer L. Kimball and Ronald N. Boyce, The Adequacy of State Insurance Rate
Regulation: The McCarran-FergusonAct in HistoricalPerspective, 56 MICH. L.
REV. 545, 545 (1958). In 1969, another observer of insurance regulation referred
to the state of affairs as a "time of trial for state regulation of insurance, with the
persistent threat of federal takeover." Werner Pfennigstorf, The Enforcement of
Insurance Laws, 1969 Wis. L. REv. 1026, 1027. Senator Howard Metzenbaum
introduced a bill in 1991, which never reached the floor of Congress for a vote,
that would have created a federal agency with broad powers to regulate insurance.
S. 1644, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) (re-introduced during the 1993 session).
Federal regulation of insurance has therefore been a constant subject of legislation
and further attempts to expand federal regulation of insurance are likely.
63. H.R. 1290, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
64. See ALLIANCE OF AMERICAN INSURERS, BULLETIN No. 92-11 (1992);
Marian Freedman, Two-Tier Regulation:Fueling the Fire, BEST'S REVIEW, June
1992, at 26. The 1993 President of the NAIC, testifying recently before

Congressman Dingell's committee, stated that "[t]his bill would require states still
to spend money to regulate those insurers that choose not to be federally certified
while the federal government spent additional billions. By any calculation or
measure, it is clear that H.R. 1290 would cost the American taxpayer a mint while
not saving one penny." Stephen T. Foster, NAIC chief blasts dual regulation,Bus.
INS., May 3, 1993, at 45. But see Subcommittee on Consumer Creditand Insurance
Holds Two-Day Hearingon H.R. 1257, NAIC NEWS (Nat'l Ass'n of Ins. Comm'rs,
Kansas City, Mo.), Apr. 1993, at 6.
65. Another proposed solution to the insolvency dilemma is the use of
interstate compacts. See generally Robert H. Myers, Can Interstate Compacts Solve
the InsuranceRegulation Debate?, RISK MGMT., August 1993, at 52. Aspects of
the insurance industry believed to be suitable for regulation through such compacts
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Passage of the Federal Insurance Solvency Act seems doubtful
in light of the "turf wars" between various members of Congress,66
as well as the continued pressure against the bill exerted by
insurance industry lobbyists.67 While a century ago the insurance
industry favored federal regulation,6 today, with few exceptions,
it supports the NAIC's position of continued state regulation.69
State regulators and industry members fear that repeal of the
McCarran-Ferguson antitrust exemption or the enactment of the
Federal Insurance Solvency Act will lead to increased federal
preemption, but, in reality, the federal government has been
chipping away at state regulation for many years. It has done so
by creating its own insurance entities in several areas, such as the

include agent licensing, liquidation and rehabilitation proceedings, solvency and
regulation of alien insurers.
66. Representatives John Dingell (Chairman, House Energy and Commerce
Committee) and Henry Gonzalez (Chairman, House Banking, Finance and Urban
Affairs Committee) have been locked in a fierce and often public battle to
determine which committee will have responsibility for overseeing insurance. In
1993, both committees considered bills that would create a major federal role in
insurance regulation. See Steven Brostoff, Crossfire in Congress Hits Insurers,
NAT'L UNDERWRrTR, April 5, 1993, at 1.

67. Well-known insurance industry groups include the Alliance of American
Insurers ("AAI"), the Insurance Information Institute ("III"), the American
Council of Life Insurance ("ACLI"), the Health Insurance Association of America
("HIAA") and the National Association of Independent Insurance Agents &
Brokers ("NAIIAB"). The largest insurance trade association in Alaska is the
Alaska Independent Insurance Agents and Brokers ("AIIAB").
68. After the Civil War and through the first decade of this century, leading
insurance executives advocated the federalization of supervision, taxation and
chartering of insurers. H. Clay Johnson, Insurance Regulation at the Crossroads,
648 INs. L.J. 7, 10 (1977). The landmark case of Paul v. Virginia, see supra text
accompanying note 38, was actually brought by insurance interests as a test case
in an effort to make the Commerce Clause a bar to state regulation and taxation.
See DAY, supra note 14, at 14-15.
69. Johnson, supra note 68, at 9-10. State regulation may be jeopardized,
however, should Executive Life, the country's second largest insolvency, result in
liquidation, which at this point appears possible. See Cynthia J. Borrelli, Public
Regulation of InsuranceLaw: Recent Developments, 27 TORT & INS. L.J. 418, 418
n.4 (1992). Alaska employee retirement benefits, including $134 million in
guaranteed investment contracts ("GICs"), were heavily invested in Executive
Life. The nation's largest insurer insolvency to date involved Mutual Benefit Life
Insurance Company, a nine billion dollar entity. Thus far, the efforts of other
insurers have saved Mutual Benefit Life from liquidation.
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Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation for banks and thrifts," by
participating with the insurance industry in making insurance
available 7' and by overt regulation.7 Further legislation impacting health insurance seems likely under the Clinton Administration.7 3
State regulation of the business of insurance is presently under
the congressional microscope, and "there [has] never been as
serious an effort [to create a federal role in regulating insurance]

as those initiated during the 102d Congress."'74 While the NAIC
warns that increased federal regulation would destroy jobs, thereby
harming local and state economies, and ultimately increase
insurance costs to consumers,.' if states ultimately fail to protect
insurance consumers, Congress will continue to seek a greater role
in this important area.
IV.

A.

INSURANCE REGULATION IN ALASKA

Territorial Days (1867 to 1959)

Alaska's territorial legislature passed its first law regulating
insurance in 1915.76 Initially, the regulatory role of the state was

70. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1811-1832 (1988). The Federal Crop Insurance Program is
another example of the federal government creating a federal entity to enter the
business of insurance. See 7 U.S.C. §§ 1501-1520.
71. In the Product Liability Risk Retention Act of 1981, Congress established
retention and purchasing groups in response to the increasing unavailability of
product liability insurance. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 3901-3906. In addition, the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA") created significant federal
oversight of group health insurance. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461. Due to recent
catastrophic storms, including the summer 1993 flooding in the Midwest, the
National Flood Insurance Program has received increasing attention. See 42
U.S.C. §§ 4001-4128 (1988 & Supp. 1991). In 1975, the plan had 540,000 policies
covering potential losses of $13 billion. Today, there are 2.6 million policies with
a total risk of $229 billion. See Fred Bayles, Insurance Industry Put on Storm
Alert, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, May 30, 1993, at G6.
72. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395-1395ccc (1988 & Supp. 1991) (Medicare).
73. The national stakes involve an estimated 460,000 jobs and $280 billion in
annual premiums for approximately 1500 health insurers. See, e.g., Why Insurers
Just Say No, ALASKA HosP. AND NURSING HOMES, Feb. 1993, at 2. It is likely
that Clinton's plan will impact health insurance provided through workers'
compensation and automobile insurance.
74. NATIONAL ASS'N OF INS. COMM'RS, 1993 IssuEs 50.
75. See id,
76. As a young state, Alaska has had the benefit of drawing upon legislation
which evolved through the hard work of other states.
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a passive one; Alaska merely required that insurers annually file
financial statements' and "certificates of qualification" stating that
the entity or person was "qualified to carry on the business of
insurance in [Alaska] in accordance with the laws thereof' '8 The
1915 legislature also required that persons or entities involved in
selling insurance obtain licenses from the Territorial Treasurer, and
pay a one percent tax on all premiums contracted for or collected.79 These initial requirements, though modified over the years,
can be found in Alaska's present insurance code.
Insurance regulation soon evolved beyond receiving data and
collecting premium taxes, however, and in 1937 Alaska significantly
changed its insurance laws with the enactment of its first true
insurance code.' The 1937 law established the Territorial Auditor
as "Ex-officio Insurance Commissioner" and charged him with
executing the insurance laws"' and submitting annual reports to
the legislature and governor containing data on all authorized
insurance companies, receipts and disbursements of the insurance2
commissioner, and proposed amendments to the insurance code.8
The 1937 law granted broad powers to the commissioner,
including the right to examine the books and records of any
insurance company or agent who the commissioner reasonably
believed to be violating the insurance laws. 3 The commissioner

77. Act of Apr. 29, 1915, ch. 57, 1915 Alaska Sess. Laws 107-08. See also Act
of May 5, 1921, ch. 43, 1921 Alaska Sess. Laws 139-40.
78. 1915 Alaska Sess. Laws 105-06.
79. Id. at 108. The tax was raised to 2% in 1921. 1921 Alaska Sess. Laws 140.

Today, the tax is 2.7%. ALASKA STAT. § 21.09.210(b)(1) (1993).
80. Act of Mar. 4, 1937, ch. 22, 1937 Alaska Sess. Laws 60-88.
81. Id. at 63.
82. Id. at 64. Although expanded in scope, the reporting requirement still

exists today. Annual reports now provide a variety of baseline data on Alaska's
insurance market and the industry's activities. See ALASKA STAT. § 21.06.110
(1993).
The first annual report filed by the commissioner in 1939 provides an
interesting contrast to current activity by the Division of Insurance. In 1939, the
Territory had 82 insurance companies authorized to transact business, 86 licensed
insurance agents, 1 licensed insurance broker and $22,946 in premium taxes paid.
REPORT OF INS. COMM'R, TERR. OF ALASKA 3 (1938). By comparison, in fiscal
year 1992, there were 1,086 authorized insurers, 2,808 individuals licensed as agents
(resident only), 235 individuals licensed as brokers (resident only) and $26,342,790
in premium taxes collected. ALASKA DEP'T OF COM. AND ECON. DEv., Div. OF
INs., 54T ANNuAL REPORT 1, 3, 18 (1992).
83. See 1937 Alaska Sess. Laws 63-64.
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also had authority to bring suit to enforce the insurance regulations,
and to suspend or revoke a company's certificate of authority if a
company was determined to have violated the insurance laws or an
order of the commissioner, or if the company was insolvent or in
an unsafe financial condition.84
The 1937 law also made it easier for insureds to bring suits
against insurance companies. The law required an insurer to
consent to service of process through the commissioner prior to
being issued a certificate of authority (that is, an insurance
license)Y This requirement was significant because there were no
domestic insurers in the Alaska Territory at that time. Foreign
insurance companies were also required, at the discretion of the
commissioner, to file a bond, not to exceed $20,000, for the purpose
of answering monetary judgments, decrees or orders of the
territorial courts.' This requirement was the precursor to the
current statutory deposit requirement.8
The 1937 law also addressed the licensing of insurance agents
and brokers.' All licenses were subject to annual renewal, and
the commissioner had broad discretion to grant or deny a license
and impose penalties for non-compliance with licensing requirements.89 The commissioner could also suspend or revoke a license
if, after notice and hearing, he found the agent "guilty of any
willful violation of the insurance law."' These prohibitions laid
the groundwork for the current licensing scheme for agents and

84. Id. at 63-64, 69. The ability to deny, fail to renew or revoke an insurer's
license or certificate of authority to do business has been described as the
backbone of a commissioner's power. DAY, supra note 14, at 10.
85. 1937 Alaska Sess. Laws 65. A certificate could be denied, however, at the
commissioner's discretion. See id. at 69 (implying that only the revocation and
suspension of a certificate already granted requires a hearing). The service of
process requirements have remained essentially unchanged. When applying for a
certificate of authority today, an insurer must complete separate forms which
appoint the director as its agent for service of process in Alaska and designate a
person to receive the service from the director. ALASKA STAT. § 21.09.180 (1993).
86. 1937 .Aaska Sess. Laws 66.
87. ALASKA STAT. § 21.09.090 (1993).

88. 1937 Alaska Sess. Laws 70-73.
89. See id. at 70-72.
90. Id. at 72. Prohibited activities included engaging in willful overinsurance,
misrepresentation concerning the product, deception or unjust dealing with any
person with regard to any insurance policy, as well as willful failure to transmit
premiums, misrepresentation in license application materials, offering inducements
and rebating. Id. at 72-73.
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brokers9 ' as well as the trade practices legislation' that would
develop soon after the passage of the McCarran-Ferguson Act.
The 1937 law also adopted the standard insurance policies of
Washington and New York as the standard forms for the Territory- 3 Prior to issuing any policy,. an insurance company doing
business in the Territory was required to obtain the commissioner's
approval, which was based on a determination that the policy
conformed to the language and style of the standard forms.94
On the important issue of liquidating insolvent or financially
impaired insurers, the 1937 law granted the commissioner power to
revoke an insurer's certificate of authority if it failed to meet the
capital requirements. The commissioner could also apply to the
court for revocation of the insurer's charter and for the appointment of a receiver to wind up its affairs.95 Under the statute, the
receiver could not distribute assets until all risks were protected.
Alaska's current procedures for liquidating insurers, although
significantly expanded, follow similar guidelines."
Alaska's legislature amended the new insurance code in 1939,
establishing procedures for licensing non-resident agents and
brokers' and providing for sanctions to be imposed on agents and
brokers who knowingly place insurance with an insurer who is
financially impaired or insolvent. 9 In addition, all agents and
brokers, whether resident or non-resident, were required to keep
complete records of their business transactions, subject to inspection by the commissioner. 9 Successor laws to these recordkeeping and inspection provisions are an essential part of regulating
licensees today.
In 1947, the legislature enacted Alaska's first rate law for the
express purpose of "promot[ing] the public welfare by regulating
insurance rates to the end that they shall not be excessive,
inadequate or unfairly discriminatory, and to authorize and regulate
91. ALASKA STAT. §§ 21.27.010-.460 (1993).

92. See id 88 21.36.010-.420.
93. 1937 Alaska Sess. Laws 80.
94. Id. at 81. Alaska's current insurance code has greatly expanded these
provisions. See ALASKA STAT. §§ 21.42.010-.375 (1993).
95. 1937 Alaska Sess. Laws 77-78.
96. See ALASKA STAT. §8 21.78.010-.330 (1993).
97. Act of Mar. 9, 1939, ch. 66, 1939 Alaska Sess. Laws 157-59.
98. Id. at 162. Violators were subject to a fine of not less than $50 and not

more than $250 as well as the revocation of their licenses. Id.
99. Id. at 159-60.
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cooperative action among insurers in rate making and in other
matters within the scope of th[e] Act."'" The correlative chapter
of the current insurance code contains a nearly identical statement
of purpose and is similar in many substantive respects.'
Consistent with the antitrust exemption, the rate law gave fire
and casualty insurers"° the freedom to collaborate regarding
1 3
rates, typically as members of rating organizations or bureaus, 0

100. Act of Mar. 14, 1947, ch. 58, 1947 Alaska Sess. Laws 138. Modem
commentators have offered the following explanation of rate laws:
The business of insurance is so far affected with a public interest as
to justify legislative regulation of its rates. The policy of a state in
regulating insurance rates is to establish rates that are neither excessive
nor inadequate and to encourage cooperation in the rate-making, while
at the same time permitting reasonable compensation, neither prohibiting
nor encouraging rate uniformity. There is a clear legislative intent to
regulate the insurance business in such a manner as to protect the public
insofar as it is possible by providing insurance premiums low enough to
maintain competition and to prevent unreasonable profits and yet high
enough to enable the insurers to provide the protection necessary to meet
the claims against their insureds and requirements of the insuring public.
19 JoHN A. APPLEMAN & JEAN APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACrICE

§ 10491 (1982).
101. See ALASKA STAT. § 21.39.010 (1993).

102. In Alaska, as is true in the vast majority of states, insurance rates for most
reinsurance, disability (health) insurance and marine insurance are not regulated.
Id. § 21.39.020(b).
103. Rating organizations or bureaus collect statistics to develop rates and rate
schedules for approved policy forms. They must be licensed and are closely
regulated to assure consumers fair and non-discriminatory prices. See generally id.
§ 21.39.060. A "bureau" state is one in which a rating organization has been
licensed and typically has also been designated as the statistical agency for a line
or lines of insurance. The status is generally exclusive, and the rating organization
commonly files rates, forms and rules on behalf of all insurers selling the
respective line(s). Rate flexibility is still available, and the insurance code provides
for deviations from the filed rates. Id. § 21.39.070. Alaska is a "bureau" state for
workers' compensation. The National Council on Compensation Insurance
("NCCI"), the largest national rating organization for workers' compensation
insurance, is the designated rating agency in Alaska.
The preeminent as well as largest rating organization for property/casualty
lines, Insurance Services Office ("ISO"), was formed in 1971 through the
consolidation of six national insurance rating or service organizations. ISO is an
insurer-supported, national, non-profit corporation that meets various needs of
property/casualty insurers in the United States. Its participants include 1400
domestic property and casualty insurers, and it is licensed in all 50 states.
INSURANCE SERV. OFFICES, INC., ISO PRODUCrS AND SERVICES 1 (1987). ISO

has expanded its operations beyond merely setting rates. Among other things, it
provides actuarial services, develops advisory rules and insurance policy language,
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subject to regulatory oversight for fairness. The law also required

that an insurer, or a licensed rating organization, file certain
required data with the insurance commissioner to support its rates.
While most state insurance regulatory agencies cannot set rates, as

they merely have the power to approve, disapprove or set them
aside,1" rate laws nevertheless provide insurance commissioners

with one of their strongest means of affecting public policy° 5-- the discretion to control insurance premium rates for
6

consumers. 10
In 1955, another pivotal year for Alaskan insurance regulation,
the legislature established the Alaska Insurance Commission as the
agency to oversee insurance regulation."
The 1955 Act also
created an independent commissioner of insurance to be appointed

develops and distributes manuals containing the advisory rating information, and
acts as a statistician. INSURANCE SERv. OFFICES, INC., PROFILE: INSURANCE
SERVICES OFFICE 1, 3 (1987). ISO recently began publishing and filing advisory
loss costs, upon which a portion of a rate is based, in an effort to avoid perceived
antitrust problems. See generally ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 3, §§ 29.200-.300
(July 1993).
104. Alaska is a "prior approval" state, meaning that any rate, rule, or form
must be approved before it may be used in this state. ALASKA DEP'T OF COM.
AND ECON. DEv., Div. OF INS., BULLETIN 93-03 2 (1993).
105. While the definition of the term "public policy" is not one upon which
political scientists have reached consensus, it nonetheless always refers to actions
of government and the intentions that determine those actions. See C. COCHRAN,
AMERICAN PUBLIC POLICY: AN INTRODUCTION 2 (3d ed. 1990). See also
Manning v. Alaska R.R. Corp., 853 P.2d 1120, 1123 (Alaska 1993) ("[A]
governmental authority functions as a administrative agency when it formulates
general policy or when it applies such policy to particular persons in their
individual capacities." (citing Winegardner v. Greater Anchorage Area Borough,
534 P.2d 541, 544 (Alaska 1975))). Insurance regulation is fraught with public
policy considerations. See generally KIMBALL, supra note 22.
106. See generally APPLEMAN & APPLEMAN, supra note 100, § 10491.
Predictably, rate regulation is sometimes criticized as being politically motivated,
particularly when exercised by elected insurance commissioners. MEHR ET AL.,
supra note 2, at 696-97.
107. Act of Mar. 3,1955, ch. 18,1955 Alaska Sess. Laws 62-64. The commission
consisted of five members appointed by the governor, with members serving
staggered five year terms. In addition to a residency requirement, the commission
required that "(1) two members ... be selected from persons regularly engaged
as agents or brokers of fire or casualty insurance; (2) one member ...[be]
selected from persons who are life insurance agents or brokers; and (3) two
members ...[be] selected to represent the public and shall have no direct or
indirect interest in any insurance business or company, but may be policy holders."
Id. § 7 at 63.
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by, and serve at the pleasure of, the Commission."° The commissioner, "selected on the basis of his knowledge of [the] insurance
business,"' 9 was charged with "supervis[ing] the conduct of all
business relating to insurance companies and societies, domestic
and foreign, to the extent authorized or directed by law."' " 0
Even with the establishment of the Insurance Commission and
the position of commissioner, by 1959 there were few actual
regulators in Alaska. The legislature allocated to the Insurance
Department only $1900 for personnel salaries."' Nevertheless,
the territorial legislature considered insurance regulation an
important issue, as evidenced by the 1957 revision of the insurance
code to address requirements for authorizing insurers and surplus
lines insurers, capital and surplus limits, licensing, and unfair trade
practices.12 The premium tax was also raised to three percent,"' thereby substantially increasing tax revenues." 4
B. Regulation Since Statehood (1959 to present)
Insurance regulation activity since statehood has mirrored
Alaska's growth. Alaska was the second-fastest growing state in
the nation in the 1980's, with its population increasing 31.1 percent
from 1980 to 1989. However, the last seven years reflect a
disproportionate increase in insurance activity that cannot be
attributed solely to population increases. The following table 5
indicates this change in population, along with the increase in the
activities of the Division of Insurance:

108. Id. §§ 3-4 at 63.
109. Id. § 4 at 63.
110. Id. § 5(3) at 63.
111. Act of Mar. 20, 1957, ch. 72, 1957 Alaska Sess. Laws 85.
112. Act of Apr. 8, 1957, ch. 173, 1957 Alaska Sess. Laws 376-403.
113. Act of Apr. 6, 1957, ch. 185, 1957 Alaska Sess. Laws 451.
114. See ALASKA DEP'T OF COM., 1960 REP. OF DIv. OF INS. 1.
115. Statistics derived from ALASKA DEP'T OF COM., REP. OF DIV. OF INS.
(1960, 1985, 1992).
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Population
Admitted insurers
Premium receipts
Premium taxes
Licenses issued
Annual Budget
Employees

226,000
303
$197 m
$857,211
645
$42,400
4

1985
533,000
971
$829 m
$17.5 m
2,915
$1.0 m
19

1992
590,000
1,086
$1.2 b
$26.3 m
6,155
$2.5 m
51

*m=milion; b=billion

The growth of the Division of Insurance since the time of
statehood can be attributed in large part to adequate funding as
well as the legislature's enactment of laws conferring upon it
Adequate
greater responsibility for regulating insurance." 6
11 7
funding is vital to effective state insurance regulation, and the
states most often cited for the quality of their insurance regulatory
agencies are those with the most resources."' The Division is

116. The Alaska Division of Insurance had a budget of approximately $3.4

million for 1993, ranking it 33rd out of the 55 members of the NAIC. 1991 NAIC
RESOURCES PEP., supra note 25, at 21. Alaska's insurance regulators have not

always been so fortunate. In 1955, the commissioner complained of the mere
$18,000 in funding that the Division received for a two-year period, asserting that,
with a staff of only one full-time employee, the office faced a great burden in
monitoring the activities of hundreds of insurers and licensees, and collecting taxes
and fees exceeding $780,000. REPORT OF INS. COMM'R, TERR. OF ALASKA 5-6
(1955).
117. See, e.g., DAY, supra note 14, at 13; Meg Fletcher, Money, Staff Add Up
to Superior Insurance Regulation, Bus. INS., Dec. 7, 1992, at 3. See also
CONSUMER INS. INTEREST GROUP, THE ADEQUACY OF RESOURCES AVAILABLE

TO STATE INSURANCE DEPARTMENTS 10-11 (1992); Don't IgnoreState Regulation,
Bus. INS., Dec. 7, 1992, at 8 ("To hope for better funding for insurance
departments is probably wishful thinking. However, state legislators must be told
that effective regulation requires adequate personnel and systems, both of which
cost money.").
Under-funding of state insurance regulation has been a serious concern of the
NAIC. Due to the increased number of insurer insolvencies and the NAIC's
accreditation program, however, insurance department budgets have increased at
an average rate of more than three and a half times the pace of inflation between
1987 and 1993. ROBERT B. KLEIN & JULIENNE L. FRITZ, NATIONAL ASS'N OF
INS. COMM'RS, SPECIAL RESEARCH REPORT. RECENT TRENDS IN STATE

INSURANCE DEPARTMENT RESOURCES AND AcrwviIs 3 (1993).
118. E.g., California ($92.7 million), Florida ($47.6 million), Illinois ($16.8
million), New York ($62.8 million). 1991 NAIC RESOURCES REP., supra note 25,
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one of the few state agencies to consistently grow over the last few
years, and it maintained that growth through the recession in
Alaska during the mid to late 1980's.
In 1959, the legislature abolished the Alaska Insurance
Commission and the office of Commissioner of Insurance, replacing
them with a Director of Insurance, appointed by the governor 1 9
and housed within the newly created Department of Commerce.121 'While some states allow their chief insurance regulators
to perform more than one function, Alaska's director is appointed
solely to oversee insurance regulation, thus reducing the likelihood
of any conflicts of interest.
By 1960, piecemeal adoption of Alaska's insurance laws had
resulted in a code containing much confusion and ambiguity.
Developments in insurance over the preceding years had rendered
some existing regulatory theories obsolete, and statehood brought
an ever-expanding insurance market, as new domestic companies
organized and foreign insurers opened local branch offices.
Consequently, the Director requested the administration and
legislature to authorize
and prepare a comprehensive, up-to-date
2
insurance code.' 1
After some intervening legislative activity, a bill passed in
1966, resulting in a major revision of the insurance code.'2
Drafted by Joseph Loonan, a former Alaska Insurance Director
(1962-1964), the bill received the general support of trade associations and major national insurance companies."m Seeking to pass
a law "represent[ing] the best grouping of law from other states,"
the legislature borrowed language from NAIC model laws as well
as laws in Montana, Idaho and Washington. 24

at 21.
119. Approximately 75% of NAIC members choose their chief insurance
regulatory officer through gubernatorial appointment. Id. at 3.
120. Act of Apr. 3, 1959, ch. 64, 1959 Alaska Sess. Laws 51-52.
121. ALASKA DEP'T OF COM., REP. OF THE Div. OF INS. 1 (1960).
122. See HOUSE COM. COMM. OF ALASKA, ALASKA INS. CODE, H.R. JOURNAL
No. 12, at 19-43 (Mar. 3, 1966) [hereinafter H.R. JOURNAL No. 12].
123. The representative of the Alaska Association of Insurance Agents, Inc.,
generally spoke in support of the bill, although he did criticize it as tending to
repel rather than induce insurers to open domestic offices in Alaska. Id. at 34.
124. Id. at 20. Changes to chapter 21 of the insurance code, dealing with
investments by domestic insurers, were described by industry representatives as
making "Alaska the easiest state in which to do business." Id. at 27. Whether
that was true, the fact remains that the 1966 revision was a conscious effort to
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The 1966 revision brought significant changes to Alaska's

insurance regulatory structure. The new Division of Insurance was
placed within the reorganized Department of Commerce and

Economic Development."z While the legislative history reflects
discussions concerning whether the state should have returned to
the use of a commissioner, the legislature eventually decided to stay
with a "strong director."'"6 The legislature vested the power to
appoint the director in the commissioner of the Department of
Commerce and Economic Development,2 7 and mandated that the
director "servef- at the pleasure of the commissioner."'"

Today,

attract insurers to Alaska, and it was largely successful. In the year preceding the
effective date of the 1966 revision, there were 402 authorized insurers and 856
licensed individuals. Three years later there were 500 authorized insurers and 967
licensees. ALASKA DEP'T OF COM., Div. OF INS., 1966 ALASKA INS. REP. 4;
ALASKA DEP'T OF COM. AND ECON. DEV., Div. OF INS., 1969 ALASKA INS. REP.
4.
125. ALASKA STAT. §§ 21.06.020, 44.33.010 (1993); Act of Apr. 26, 1960, ch.
187, 1960 Alaska Sess. Laws 308.
126. See H.R. JOURNAL No. 12, supra note 122, at 20-22. Over the years, the
tendency of the Alaska legislature has been to add to rather than subtract from
the director's functions and authority.
127. As a practical matter, the governor can be expected to have some input in
the appointment of a director or the decision to terminate him.
128. ALASKA STAT. § 21.06.010 (1993). Although some fiercely argue for an
elected chief regulatory officer, appointment makes better sense for several
reasons. See generally Don't ignore state regulation,Bus. INS., Dec. 7, 1992, at 8.
First, a well-funded, but otherwise unqualified, person could get elected, which
could be disastrous in such an extremely complex industry. An insurance industry
insider who was elected as director could use the position to further industry
interests at the expense of Alaska insurance consumers. Also, vigorous
enforcement of the insurance code may not be politically expedient for an elected
director faced with disciplining a wealthy, influential and popular licensee.
Allowing the chief regulatory officer to be elected opens the door to the possibility
of abuses attendant to the power of incumbency, such as entrenched bureaucracy
and a reluctance to try new approaches. Appointed individuals may be less
susceptible to political pressure, as they need not worry about the impact their
decisions could have on their chances for re-election. These concerns, if realized,
would be contrary to the insurance code's overriding goal of protecting consumers.
With insurance regulation having evolved to its present status, the mistaken
appointment of an unqualified individual would be disastrous for the Alaska
Division of Insurance. In this highly regulated industry which is so vital to the
public interest, the commissioner of the Department of Commerce and Economic
Development should appoint a person who has a good understanding of insurance,
hopefully gained through some experience with the industry, as well as sufficient
administrative skills with which to supervise and coordinate the efforts of over 50
individuals. Making a correct appointment is the best protection against abuse.
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the powers of Alaska's director of insurance, like powers granted
directors 129and commissioners elsewhere, are complex and farreaching.

The 1966 law also significantly increased the statutory security
requirement for insurers. Recognizing the inadequacy of the
$20,000 maximum bond from 1937,"3 the legislature raised the
requirement for insurers to $300,000.131
The most important aspect of the 1966 revision, however, was
that it provided Alaska with a comprehensive and coherent
insurance code, greatly improving upon typical insurance codes,
which one commentator described as "a rubbish heap without
parallel in the law-making of modem man.., the deciphering of
which would tax the genius that was spent in reconstructing
classical Roman law from the interpolations of the Justinian
compilations."''
While a few of the code's thirty-nine chapters
are difficult to understand," over the years the Alaska legislature
See Andrew F. Giffen, Comments on the Bases and Limitations of the Regulatory
Powers of Insurance Commissioners,13 FORuM 397, 402 (1978).
129. See generally 2 RONALD A. ANDERSON, COUCH CYCLOPEDIA OF
INSURANCE LAW 2D §§ 21:4-23 (1959); APPLEMAN & APPLEMAN, supra note 100,
§§ 10391-10394.
130. See supra text accompanying note 86.
131. See H.R. JOURNAL No. 12, supra note 122, at 24. The amount of deposit
required remains the same today. ALASKA STAT. § 21.09.090 (1993).
132. The Director of Insurance described the revision as follows:
While voluminous, it is extremely well organized and easy to use.
Although all of its parts are related, the different subjects are given
complete treatment in respective chapters, and the chapters, in turn
group together in accordance with major subject classifications. The plan
of organization, which has been called an "organic" plan, since it strives
to place each factor of the insurance law in its proper place in relation
to the whole, and to avoid the repetition which brings disorganization
and confusion to the statutes, is designed not only for proper and clear
presentation of the law for the present, but to facilitate and [sic] future
growth of the various aspects of the law.
DEP'T OF COM., Div. OF INS., 1966 ALASKA INS. RFP. V.
133. Spencer L. Kimball, Introduction: Unfinished Business in Insurance
Regulation, 1969 Wis. L. Rnv. 1019, 1019 (1969). Professor Kimball also referred
to the Wisconsin insurance code as "a complex and internally inconsistent jungle
of provisions, the objectives of which are seldom clear and the logical relation in
which [sic] is never evident." Id. His criticisms were in large part responsible for
the reform of Wisconsin's insurance laws, which served as a model of reform for
other states.
134. It is difficult to address in lay terms some of the arcane topics that are
basic to insurance regulation. Statutes addressing actuarial computations or
insurance accounting methods, which are unique to the industry, illustrate the
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has done a credible job making the code comprehensible. 135 The
clarity of Alaska's insurance code is a result of both good drafting
and the legislature's determination to see that all laws be enacted
pursuant to a standardized procedure.'36
Many insurance laws have been enacted on isolated subjects
since the 1966 revision, and the work of the 1990 legislature is
particularly noteworthy. That year, the legislature sought to
address insurer insolvency problems. 37 The legislature revised
chapter 21.78 of the insurance code, which provides the statutory
mechanism for rehabilitation and liquidation of an insurer.1 38 The
revision granted the director of insurance broad powers to either
rehabilitate or liquidate an insurer based upon appropriate

esoteric nature of some topics. E.g., ALASKA STAT. § 21.18 (accounting); § 21.21
(investments); § 21.34 (surplus line taxes); § 21.39 (rates); §§ 21.79-.80 (guaranty
funds) (1993).
135. Even the 1937 insurance code, which was just 29 pages, was applauded by
some as "cover[ing] the subject as well as many of such codes containing several
hundred pages." REPORT OF INS. COMM'R, TERR. OF ALASKA 7 (1939).

Reflecting the growth of insurance regulation activities, the current insurance code
exceeds 500 pages.
136. "Bills and resolutions shall be prepared and introduced in the manner and
form prescribed in the uniform rules and the legislative style manual." ALASKA
STAT. § 24.08.060(a) (1993). The drafting manual emphasizes conciseness and
simplicity wherever possible. See generally LEGISLATIVE AFF. AGENCY, MANUAL
OF LEGISLATIVE DRAFrmNG 46-54 (1983). The legislature also requires that

regulations be succinct and easily understandable whenever possible. All state
regulatory bodies must follow the drafting guidelines set forth in the Department
of Law's Drafting Manual for Administrative Regulations. See ALASKA STAT.
§ 44.62.050 (1993). See also Northern Lights Motel, Inc. v. Sweaney, 561 P.2d
1176,1181 n.7 (Alaska 1977). Notwithstanding these efforts, regulations in general
have recently been criticized as "difficult to read, hard to understand and contrary
to legislative intent." GOVERNOR'S CONF. ON SMALL Bus., FINAL REPORT TO
GOVERNOR STEVE COWPER 5 (Nov. 1989), reprinted in GOVERNOR'S TASK
FORCE ON REGULATORY REFORM, FINAL REPORT (Mar. 19, 1993).
137. Insurance companies are not subject to federal bankruptcy proceedings,
and the bankruptcy code provides that liquidation and rehabilitation proceedings
against insurers are matters for the states to regulate. See 11 U.S.C. § 109(b)(2),
(3) (1988). Notwithstanding the exclusive delegation to the states in this area,
insurer insolvency issues sometimes invade bankruptcy proceedings. See generally
Davis J. Howard, Bankruptcy Proceedings and Insurance Company Insolvency
Proceedings: Things That Go Bump in the Night, 17 OIO N.U. L. REv. 255
(1990).
138. See ALASKA STAT. § 21.78 (1993) (enacting the NAIC's Insurers
Rehabilitation and Liquidation Model Act).
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statutory grounds.'39 According to the new law, after commencing delinquency proceedings in the superior court and gaining
appointment as receiver, the director must then take certain
required actions, similar to those of a corporate CEO in the case
of rehabilitation, or to those of a bankruptcy trustee if the decision
is made to liquidate the company.' 40
The 1990 legislature, with the strong backing of the Governor,
also addressed guaranty associations, organizations which administer guaranty funds used to pay covered claims in the event an
insurer is unable to do so. 1 4 1 That year, the legislature passed the
142
Alaska Life and Disability Insurance Guaranty Association Act
1 43
and amended the Alaska Insurance Guaranty Association Act.
During the 1992 legislative session, the Alaska legislature once
again demonstrated its continued commitment to insurance
regulation by revising the insurance code. 4 Due in large part to
the passage of this legislation and the Division's subsequent
adoption of certain regulations, 14 the Division of Insurance
achieved an important national distinction in December 1992 when
it attained NAIC accreditation.'" These developments reflect the
Division's dedication to protecting consumers, while creating a
healthy business environment within which insurers and insurance
professionals may operate successfully. 47

139. See id § 21.78.040 (rehabilitation), § 21.78.050 (liquidation).
140. See id § 21.78.090 (rehabilitation), § 21.78.100 (liquidation).
141. See ALASKA STATE LEGIS., SENATE JOuRNAL 1049 (1989). Among other
things, Governor Cowper was concerned that the previously existing guaranty fund
did not adequately protect commercial fishing interests. Id.
142. See ALASKA STAT. § 21.79 (1993).
143. See id- § 21.80.
144. Act of June 15, 1992, ch. 67, 1992 Alaska Sess. Laws 55. See infra text
accompanying notes 155-176.
145. The director has general authority to adopt reasonable regulations to
implement the insurance code. ALASKA STAT. § 21.06.090 (1993). Some sections
of the insurance code also provide specific authority for the adoption of
implementing regulations. E.g., id. §§ 21.22.130, 21.57.130, 21.89.060.
146. See infra text accompanying notes 177-185.
147. The mission statement of the Alaska Division of Insurance states:
The mission of the Division of Insurance is to protect and serve
Alaska by developing, interpreting, and enforcing the insurance statutes
and regulations; by protecting Alaska insurance consumers; by enhancing
the insurance business environment; and by providing information and
resources to the public for knowledgeable management of their insurance
affairs.
ALASKA Div. OF INS., 1992 STRATEGIC PLAN 1.
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Alaska, a state plagued with employment and environmental
hazards, is especially dependent on the insurance industry. Recent
statistics indicate that Alaskans work in uniquely dangerous
conditions, leading one commentator to note that, "[w]hether on
land or at sea, regardless of occupation, Alaskans are more likely

to die on the job than workers anywhere else in the nation."'
Additional safety hazards abound due to Alaska's unique physical
environment, including the increased risk of drowning caused by
the coldness of Alaskan waters.149 And, because a large part of

Alaska is located in one of the world's most active seismic regions,
major earthquakes are always possible. Many Americans are
unaware that the 1964 earthquake in Alaska, which devastated
downtown Anchorage and many surrounding towns, was more
severe than any earthquake ever recorded in California.'

With

metropolitan Anchorage currently containing over half the state's
population, a similar earthquake today would have catastrophic
consequences.

51

It is clear, therefore, that the risks of living in

148. Doug O'Harra, Man Overboard!,ANCHORAGE DAILY NEws, May 2,1993,
at D10. During the 1980's, the annual number of job-related deaths in Alaska was
five times the national average. Id. Commercial fishermen perish "at an annual
rate about 25 times greater than the national average for on-the-job fatalities." Id.
at D8.
149. Id. Between 1980 and 1989, 1,105 deaths or 17.8% of injury deaths were
attributable to drowning. Id. In 1991, 29 people died in boating accidents in
Alaska, a state with 31,000 registered boats. n contrast, the same year there were
56 deaths by boating accidents in Michigan, a state with 860,000 registered boats.
Hugh Curran, Boating Statistics Reveal Alaskans at Risk, ANCHORAGE DAILY
NEWs, June 7, 1993, at B1.
150. By old estimates, the 1964 earthquake measured 8.5 on the Richter Scale,
and the San Francisco earthquake of 1906 measured 8.25. Those figures have
since been revised to 9.2 for the Alaskan earthquake and 7.9 for San Francisco's.
See Hiroo Kanamori, The Energy Release in Great Earthquakes,82 J. GEOPHYSICAL RESEARCH 2981, 2982 (1977).
151. Foreseeing such events, the Division of Insurance is currently in the early
stages of developing a disaster response plan. The NAIC has addressed this topic
in the past, but has produced no model law yet. Issues which can be expected to
be addressed in the disaster response plan will likely include: (1) getting qualified
adjusters, with authority to settle claims and provide interim relief, into Alaska in
sufficient numbers to provide quick and comprehensive responses to Alaska
insurance consumers; (2) creating a fast method of adjudicating claims in the event
of a dispute; (3) facilitating a way to allow the necessary reclamation and cleanup
without "destroying the scene" which could result in insurance coverage being
denied; and (4) ensuring that markets remain in the state after the disaster has
passed. The director and two staff members from Alaska's Division of Insurance
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Alaska mandate the presence of financially sound insurance
companies.
In March 1993, the Governor's Task Force on Regulatory
Reform issued its final report. Noting that "[t]he cost of health
and other insurance and bonding is prohibitive for most small
businesses,""5 3 the task force recommended organizing selfinsurance pools, enacting risk-pooling legislation, reducing "health
cost-shifting created by uncompensated care," discouraging
mandated insurance benefits, instituting tort reform and increasing
the bond requirement for general contractors."s The Division of
Insurance can also help keep the price of insurance down by
preventing insurer insolvencies, eliminating claims fraud and
monitoring claims practices.
C. The 1992 Omnibus Bill
The Alaska insurance code recently underwent major revisions
with the passage of the Omnibus Insurance Reform Act of 1992
(the "Omnibus Bill"). 55 A primary purpose of the Omnibus Bill
was to update existing laws and provide appropriate authority for
the promulgation of needed regulations in order to secure NAIC
accreditation. Among other changes, the Omnibus Bill:
- incorporated the NAIC model law on examination of
insurance companies,156 including requirements for processing of
examination reports;
- granted the director authority to order an insurer to
undertake certain actions if that insurer is determined to be in a
financially impaired condition;"

are active with the NAIC's Catastrophe Insurance Working Group of the Personal
Lines - Property & Casualty Insurance Committee. That group is working on
legislation to be introduced in Congress providing for a program of hazard
mitigation and insurance against the risk of catastrophic natural disasters. See
generally NATURAL DISASTER MITGATION, RELIEF, AND INSURANCE Acr
(Tentative Draft, Nat'l Ass'n Ins. Comm'rs 1993).
152. See GOVERNOR'S TASK FORCE ON REGULATORY REFORM, FINAL
REPORT (March 19, 1993).
153. Id. at 5 (appendix).
154. Id. at 9 (appendix).
155. Act of June 15, 1992, ch. 67, 1992 Alaska Sess. Laws 55.
156. See ALASKA STAT. §§ 21.06.120-.210 (1993).
157. Id. § 21.09.175.
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- required state-accredited reinsurers to file annual financial
58
statements;
- adopted limitations on the types of companies in which an
insurer may invest and59on subsidiary acquisitions which result in
market concentration;
- adopted limitations on investment in medium and lower
grade bonds;"6
- adopted rules on evaluating material transactions between
161
affiliates and determining payment of extraordinary dividends;
- required insurance holding companies to file annual
registration statements; 62
- consolidated all requirements and qualifications for licensing
of insurance professionals in one chapter;'63
- adopted biennial license renewal requirements for insurance
professionals;'"
- prohibited insurance professionals from holding themselves
out as financial planners; 65
- increased the penalties for violations of the insurance
statutes; 66
- adopted financial requirements for title insurers similar to
those required for other insurers; 67
- allowed a receiver to recover insurer distributions to
affiliates if those payments were made within twelve months of a
liquidation or rehabilitation order;"
- clarified the timing and determination of eligibility for senior
premium discounts in motor vehicle insurance; 69 and

158. Md § 21.12.020(a)(2)(A).

159. Id. §§ 21.21.050, .180.
160. Id. §§ 21.21.370-.400.
161. Id. §§ 21.22.080, .100.
162. Id. § 21.22.060.
163. See generally id. § 21.27.010-.460. The portion of the insurance code
receiving the most changes was the licensing chapter, the rewrite of which took up
67 pages of the 159 page bill.
164. Id. § 21.27.380.
165. Id. § 21.36.145.

166. E.g., id. §§ 21.22.065(h-i) (holding companies), 21.27.440 (licensees),
21.33.065 (unauthorized insurers), 21.34.230 (surplus lines insurance), 21.36.320

(unfair trade practices).
167. Id. § 21.66.010.

168. Id. § 21.78.325.
169. Id. § 21.89.025.
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policies to
- required automobile and homeowner insurance
0
have an appraisal clause for settling claim disputes.1
Most provisions of the bill took effect on July 1, 1992.171
Shortly thereafter, the Division, in order to facilitate NAIC
accreditation, adopted regulations in the areas of records retention
and financial reporting of domestic insurers," life reinsurance
agreements,' 3 insurance holding companies requirements, 7 4
standards for determining insurers' impaired financial condition,7 5 and risk retention groups and purchasing groups. 176 The
passage of the Omnibus Bill, together with the adoption of these
regulations, set the stage for the visit by the NAIC accreditation
review team in October 1992.
D. NAIC Accreditation
Gaining NAIC accreditation in December 1992 was a watershed event in the history of insurance regulation in Alaska. 77

170. Id. § 21.89.035.
171. Act of June 15, 1992, ch. 67, 1992 Alaska Sess. Laws 55.
172. ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 3, §§ 21.400-.480 (July 1993). One of the most
notable of these regulations is the requirement that domestic insurers must retain
certain records "for 10 years from the date the record was created, or longer if
ordered by the director." Id. § 21.470.
173. Id. §9 21.600-.695.
174. Id. §9 21.010-.195.
175. Id. § 21.500-.520.
176. Id. 99 24.010-.590.
177. The NAIC instituted a formal state accreditation program in 1990. An
independent review team, whose job it is to assess a particular state's compliance
with the NAIC's Financial Regulation Standards and ability to regulate its
insurance industry, evaluates each state seeking accreditation. To become
accredited, a state must adopt laws substantially similar to the NAIC models. See
generally NATIONAL ASS'N OF INS. COMM'RS, FINANCIAL REGULATION
STANDARDS AND ACCREDITATION PROGRAM OF THE NAIC, March 19, 1993, at
1 [hereinafter NAIC FINANCIAL REGULATION STANDARDS]. The accreditation

program is premised on the belief that to have effective insurer solvency
regulation, a state must not only have adequate statutory and administrative
authority to regulate an insurer's corporate and financial affairs, but adequate
funding and organizational and personnel practices designed to implement that
authority. Id.; see generally RICHARD L. FOGEL, U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
INSURANCE REGULATION: ASSESSMENT OF THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF
INSURANCE COMMISSIONERS (1991). As an incentive for states to become
accredited, after December 1993, those states already accredited will only accept
reports of insurer examinations from unaccredited states under limited circumstances. NAIC FINANCIAL REGULATION STANDARDS, supra, at 1. Still, such
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Division personnel together expended thousands of hours at

achieving this goal, and the Division is presently one of only
twenty-two 178 NAIC-accredited state regulatory agencies in the
country.179 The accreditation process is ongoing, and the failure
of an NAIC member to stay current with the organization's

standards may result in accreditation being suspended. Thus, the
Division of Insurance will need to continue updating laws and
periodically in order to maintain its accredited staregulations
0
tus.

18

There are a number of reasons why NAIC accreditation is

beneficial to Alaska.

Initially, accreditation affords Alaska

reciprocity with other accredited states with respect to financial

examinations and data on insurance companies. This information
sharing should enable Alaska's regulators to save money by
concentrating their limited resources on domestic concerns without
having to spend an undue amount of time investigating foreign
insurers, thus providing consumers with a greater sense of security.
Insurers should also feel more comfortable doing business in the
state, resulting in an increase of international insurance carriers in

the Alaska market.' 8

Such increased competition from more

companies might lead to lower premium rates for insurance
measures do not correct the fundamental weakness of the NAIC-its lack of
enforcement power. See Douglas McLeod, The NAIC: Too little too late, Bus.
INS., Dec. 7, 1992, at 4; see also FAILED PROMISES, supra note 60, at 2.
178. As of November 1992,23 states had achieved accreditation. However, the
NAIC's suspension of the New York Department of Insurance in March 1993 for
failure to meet ongoing accreditation standards reduced the number to 22.
Committee Considers Additional Changes to Accreditation Standards, Suspends
New York's Accreditation,NAIC NEWS (Nat'l Ass'n of Ins. Comm'rs, Kansas City,
Mo.), March 1993, at 7.
179. In 1993, Alaska's Director of Insurance, David J. Walsh, was the Vice
President of the NAIC and the chair of the NAIC's governing body, the Executive
Committee.
180. Over the years, the Alaska Division of Insurance has adopted many of the
NAIC model laws, and NAIC source materials are useful resources for interpreting
the legislative history of those laws and regulations. Guidance for interpreting
NAIC model laws and regulations may be found in the multi-volume NAIC Model
Laws, Regulations and Guidelines. See NAIC MODEL LAWS, supra note 42. The
publication includes interpretative cases and legislative history as well as references
to drafting notes and minutes of NAIC proceedings.
181. Margaret Bauman, Insurance division wins accreditation,ALASKA J. OF
COM., Jan. 11, 1993, at 1. According to the current Director of Insurance,
accreditation will do more to secure a good insurance market for Alaska residents
and businesses than any other single factor. See id. at 1-5.
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consumers,"m while more admitted insurers in Alaska should
increase premium tax revenues for the state.18
Finally, participation in the NAIC should encourage the
Division of Insurance to employ professionals who are knowledgeable about current insurance regulation issues. The NAIC is a
resource for state-of-the-art training and education in the
regulators' respective disciplines,"s4 and with its help, Alaska's
regulators should be able to create and implement public policy on
a state level as well as contributing to the evolution of national
insurance issues.'5
E. The Judiciary's Role in Regulating Insurance
The Division of Insurance is not the sole regulator of Alaska's
insurance industry, as federal and state courts play a smaller, albeit
significant, role. Federal courts are often called upon to interpret
182. Id.
183. The Director of Insurance commented in the 1960 annual report that the
increase in admitted insurers was a factor in the substantial increase in premium
tax revenues collected. ALASKA DIv. DEP'T OF COM., REP. OF THE Div. OF INS.

1 (1960). At some level, however, an increase in admitted insurers could result in
reduced premium prices, with an attendant negative impact on premium tax
revenue.
184. The Division of Insurance will host the Fall 1996 NAIC convention in
Anchorage. The meeting is expected to attract approximately 1000 participants
and bring three million dollars into the Alaska economy.
185. In recent years, however, Congress has questioned the NAIC's effectiveness, as well as the state-based system of insurance regulation. McLeod, supra
note 177, at 3; see also Cynthia Borrelli, Public Regulation of Insurance Law:
Recent Developments, 27 TORT & INS. L.J. 418 (1991). In 1988, Representative
John Dingell commenced an investigation into the adequacy of insurance
regulation, and the NAIC has faced increasing congressional criticism since that
time. A study commissioned by Representative Dingell addressing the NAIC's
capacity to create and maintain an effective national system for solvency regulation
concluded that while the NAIC has good intentions, its efforts were likely to be
unsuccessful, as it does not have the authority to require states to adopt and
enforce its standards. Federal intervention into this area of insurance regulation
was recommended. See FOGEL, supra note 177, at 1, 4-8, 32-33; see also FAILED
PROMISES, supra note 60, at 2. Currently, there is a bill in Congress pending that
would create a cabinet level administrator to regulate insurance at the federal
level. H.R. 1257, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) (sponsored by Representative
Joseph P. Kennedy, Jr.). The bill would create a new regulatory body, the Federal
Insurance Administration, with an administrator appointed by the President. Id.
It is not expected to pass in 1993. Subcommittee on Consumer Credit and
InsuranceHolds Two-Day Hearingon H.R. 1257,NAIC NEWS (Nat'l Ass'n of Ins.
Comm'rs, Kansas City, Mo.), Apr. 1993, at 6.
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the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 8 6 and they frequently deal with
coverage issues."' The United States Supreme Court recently

issued an opinion regarding the availability of punitive damage
awards against insurers.'8

State courts on the other hand,

charged with interpreting their state insurance codes and regulations, as well as adjudicating claims disputes, also affect industry

regulation.8 9
The Alaska Supreme Court is quite active in the insurance
field, having adopted most of the nationally recognized insurance
law principles."9 ' The court has held that insurance policies are
considered contracts of adhesion 9 and, consequently, even where

186. See generally Kimball & Heaney, supra note 49.
187. Pursuant to diversity jurisdiction, federal courts handle lawsuits involving
insurance claims. In those cases, the courts interpret the applicable substantive
law as would the appropriate state court. See generally Erie R.R. Co. v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938); 1A JAMES W. MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL
PRACricE
.301-.312 (2d ed. 1993); see, e.g., LeDoux v. Continental Ins. Co., 666
F.Supp. 178 (D. Alaska 1987) (insurance coverage of punitive damages for
unintentional torts does not violate public policy).
188. See, e.g., Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1 (1991). Large
punitive damage awards coupled with expanding theories of liability contributed
to the tort reform movement of the mid-1980's. See generally Laurence Keyes,
Alaska's Apportionment of Damages Statute: Problemsfor Litigants, 9 ALASKA
L. REV. 1 (1992). In 1986, Alaska's Director of Insurance recognized in his annual
report that Alaska was one of nine states that year to adopt significant tort reform
legislation. ALASKA Div. OF INS., 48TH ANNUAL INS. REPORT 1 (1986). As a
consequence of this reform, capacity for Alaska risks increased and premiums
stabilized to the benefit of Alaska insurance consumers. Id.
189. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. §§ 9.05.015(a)(10) (1983) (jurisdiction for dispute
arising from insurance contract); 21.06.230 (1993) (order by director may be
appealed to superior court); 44.62.300 (1993) (judicial review of validity of
regulations).
190. See generally APPLEMAN, supra note 2, §§ 7401-07. Whispering Creek
Condominium Owner Ass'n v. Alaska Nat'l Insurance Co., 774 P.2d 176 (Alaska
1989), contains a comprehensive survey of Alaska case law pertaining to the
interpretation of insurance contracts. Id. at 177-78.
191. Jarvis v. Aetna Casualty and Sur. Co., 633 P.2d 1359, 1363 (Alaska 1981).
A contract of adhesion is marked by unequal bargaining power between the
parties such that one party is forced to "take it or leave it." In the context of
insurance policies, one party (the insurer) drafts the contract language and the
terms are non-negotiable. See generally APPLEMAN, supra note 2, § 7401.
Describing the non-negotiable nature of such contracts, the United States Supreme
Court stated long ago:
We may venture to observe that the price of insurance is not fixed
over the counters of the companies by what Adam Smith calls the
higgling of the market, but formed in the councils of the underwriters,
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the policy contains no ambiguities, it will be construed to provide
the coverage that would reasonably be "expected from a lay
interpretation of the policy terms."'" In addition, while construing coverage provisions in favor of insureds, the court will narrowly
construe exclusions against the insured." 3
The Alaska Supreme Court has also held that an insurer's
obligation to defend an insured is broader than its obligation to
indemnify."" The obligation to defend"95 requires that the insurer provide a defense for the entire action if any part of a lawsuit
falls within the scope of coverage afforded.'96 Even where the
complaint states a claim outside the policy, the insurer must defend
if "the true facts are within, or potentially within, the policy
coverage and are known or reasonably ascertainable to the
insurer."'" The defense obligation also requires that the insurer

promulgated in schedules of practically controlling constancy which the
applicant for insurance is powerless to oppose and which, therefore, has
led to the assertion that the business of insurance is of monopolistic
character and that "it is illusory to speak of a liberty of contract."
German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 233 U.S. 389, 416-17 (1914). See also
KIMBALL, supra note 22, at 523.
192. United States Fire Ins. Co. v. Colver, 600 P.2d 1, 3 (Alaska 1979); Puritan
Life Ins. Co. v. Guess, 598 P.2d 900, 904 (Alaska 1979).
193. Starry v. Horace Mann Ins. Co., 649 P.2d 937, 939 (Alaska 1982). Courts,
however, will not torture a policy into providing coverage where the exclusionary
language is clear. Jarvis, 633 P.2d at 1363.
194. Smith v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 629 P.2d 543, 545-46 (Alaska 1981). The
most fundamental duty an insurer owes an insured is the duty to indemnify, i.e. to
reimburse the insured for losses incurred directly by the insured or to pay sums
that the insured becomes legally obligated to pay others. See ALLAN D. WINDT,
INsuRANcE CLAIMs AND DIsPUTES 278 (1988).
195. Afcan v. Mutual Fire, Marine & Inland Ins. Co., 595 P.2d 638, 645 (Alaska
1979). The following rules apply to the insurer's duty to defend. The existence
of such a duty is a matter of contract interpretation. The duty must be undertaken
where a complaint on its face alleges a claim potentially within policy coverage.
Id. The wrongful refusal to defend may result in the insurer's liability for the
judgment even though the facts may ultimately demonstrate that no indemnity is
due. Sauer v. Home Indem. Co., 841 P.2d 176, 184 (Alaska 1992). If the insurer
has a basis for a potential conflict of interest, the insured has the unilateral right
to select independent counsel, subject to the implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing. CHI of Alaska, Inc. v. Employers Reinsurance Corp., 844 P.2d 1113,
1120-21 (Alaska 1993); see also Jim Walker & Naomi W. Klouda, Court: Insured
Can Select Own Lawyers, ALAsKA J. OF COM., June 7, 1993, at 1B (Journal of
Law section) (discussing the probable consequences of the CHI decision).
196. United States Fire Ins. Co. v. Colver, 600 P.2d 1, 4 n.4 (Alaska 1979).
197. Afcan, 595 P.2d at 646 (quoting National Indem. Co. v. Flesher, 469 P.2d
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inform the insured of all settlement offers and alert the insured to
the possibility of excess recovery. 9 In light of Alaska's unusual
attorney's fees rule, which awards fees to the prevailing party,199
the Alaska Supreme Court has held that a settlement for the
"policy limits," where the insurance policy provides for the
coverage of court costs without a cap, includes the face value of the
policy plus attorney's fees based on a projected verdict.2
Most Alaska Supreme Court decisions involving insurance
issues do not turn on an interpretation of the insurance code or
regulations, although there are some notable exceptions. O.K.
Lumber Co. v. Providence Washington Insurance Co.21 concerned
a third-party claimant suing an insurer for poor claims handling
practices. 2°2 The court ruled that third-party claimants do not
have a private cause of action under Alaska's Unfair Claims
Settlement Practices Act.203
State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Nicholson2 involved the
bad faith failure of an insurer to settle a homeowner's claim.2 5
After a judgment at trial in favor of the homeowner, State Farm
appealed, arguing that the tort of bad faith claims handling had
been recognized in Alaska only in the context of third-party
claims. 6 The court, however, held that a cause of action against
an insurer for bad faith claims handling sounds in tort even for
first-party claims.' The court reasoned that the tort of bad faith
"can be traced to the covenant of good faith and fair dealing," a
contractual duty which the court emphasized is "implied in all
The court also rejected the insurer's
insurance policies."20

360, 366 (Alaska 1970)).
198. O.K. Lumber Co. v. Providence Washington Ins. Co., 759 P.2d 523, 525
(Alaska 1988).
199. ALASKA R. Civ. P. 82(a).
200. Schultz v. Travelers Indem. Co., 754 P.2d 265, 266-67 (Alaska 1988);
ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 3, § 29.010 (July 1993). In automobile insurance cases,
this fee-shifting also requires payment of pre-judgment interest in addition to the
policy limits. Hughes v. Harrelson, 844 P.2d 1106, 1107-08 (Alaska 1993).
201. 759 P.2d 523 (Alaska 1988).
202. Id. at 524.
203. Id. at 527.
204. 777 P.2d 1152 (Alaska 1989).
205. Id.
206. Id. at 1154; see also supra note 15 (defines the term "third-party" claim).
207. State Farm, 777 P.2d at 1156.
208. Id. at 1154.
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argument that the insurance code provided sufficient incentive for
insurers to honor the duty of good faith and fair dealing, stating
that the legislature, in adopting the insurance code, did not intend
to alter an insured's right to seek punitive damages from an
insurer.2° In light of the adhesionary aspects of an insurance
contract, the court noted that the availability of this new tort action
will provide insurers with a greater incentive to honor their implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing to their insureds."'
An issue that may soon face an Alaska court is whether the
attorney-client privilege and work-product doctrine protect
insurance files from inspection by the Division of Insurance.
Recently, a dispute erupted when the Division attempted to inspect
a claims adjuster's records pursuant to Alaska Statutes sections
21.06.170 and 21.27.350.211 The attorney for the claims adjuster
argued that the Division had no authority over the file and,
alternatively, that the file was protected by the attorney-client
privilege and the work-product doctrine.21 The Division contended that neither the attorney-client privilege nor the workproduct doctrine deprives it of rights granted under the insurance
code, reasoning that otherwise the floodgates would open for any
21 3
licensee to circumvent regulatory authority through its attorney.
Due in part to the delicate nature of the claim, the matter was
resolved to the Division's satisfaction without court involvement.
It may be just a matter of time, however, before the judiciary is
called upon to determine whether the examination provisions of the
insurance code preempt
the attorney-client privilege and work214
doctrine.
product

209. Id. at 1157-58.
210. Id.
211. See In re Eyman, D92-15 (Alaska Dep't of Com. and Econ. Dev., Div. of
Ins., May 5, 1993).
212. Memorandum, State of Alaska, Dep't of Law, Jan. 7, 1993, at 4-7 (on file
with the author).
213. Id.at 5.
214. The Alaska Supreme Court has already limited the scope of the work

product doctrine and attorney-client privilege in the insurance context. See
Langdon v. Champion, 752 P.2d 999 (Alaska 1988) (concluding that (1)
"statements made by an insured to an insurer are not protected by the attorneyclient privilege unless it can be shown that the insurer, in receiving such

communication, was acting at the express direction of counsel for the insured" and
(2) "materials contained in an insurer's files shall be presumed to have been

compiled in the ordinary course of business, and, thus, outside the scope of the
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Alaska's Enforcement Mechanism

1. Scope. An insurance regulatory agency may appropriately
be characterized as a specialized law enforcement agency.2 15 With
the exception of insurance-related crimes, which are handled by the
Department of Law,216 the Division of Insurance is exclusively
responsible for implementing, monitoring and enforcing the
insurance laws-activities which may include both investigation and
adjudication.2" 1 The Division of Insurance consists of seven
sections: (1) administrative, (2) licensing,21 (3) market surveillance/conduct,2 9 (4) financial examination,'
(5) consumer

work-product doctrine, absent a showing that the materials were prepared at the
request or under supervision of the insured's attorney").
215. Pfennigstorf, supra note 62, at 1026.
216. See ALASKA STAT. § 21.36.360 (1993).
217. It § 21.06.080 (broad general powers to conduct examinations and
investigations); see also id. § 21.06.220 (director sits "in a quasi-judicial capacity").
In a long-recognized classic work addressing insurance regulation, it is stated:
"[s]ometimes the insurance commissioner is an official clerk, sometimes he is a
judge, sometimes he is a law-giver, and sometimes he is both prosecuting attorney
and [executioner]. He is partly executive, partly judicial, and partly legislative; and
yet is not confined within any of these categories." EDWIN W. PATBERSON, THE
INSURANCE COMMISSIONER IN THE UNrrED STATES 5 (1927). Thus, it is not

uncommon for an agency to undertake multiple responsibilities. See 3 KENNETH
C. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE §§ 18.1, 18.4 (2d ed. 1980);
Hortonville Joint School Dist. No. 1 v. Hortonville Educ. Ass'n, 426 U.S. 482,493
(1976); Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 49-52 (1975); In re Robson, 575 P.2d 771,
774 (Alaska 1978); In re Cornelius, 520 P.2d 76, 83-84 (Alaska 1974).
218. For that portion of the insurance industry comprised of non-insurers (i.e.
agents, brokers, adjusters, etc.) licensing is an important regulatory tool. The
NAIC has described states' broad licensing powers, including the licensing of
insurers, as "[o]ne of the pillars, if not the keystone of state regulation."
Memorandum of Explanationof ProposedText of Legislation,NAIC PROC. (Nat'l
Ass'n of Ins. Comm'rs, Kansas City, Mo.), Nov. 1944, at 35. With recent increases
in staffing, the licensing section in the Alaska Division of Insurance has been able
to scrutinize representations made by applicants.
219. This section deals with a wide range of matters, including national and
local insurance issues, consumer complaints, insurer filings, failures to comply with
existing statutes or regulations and the dissemination of information to the public.
Specifically, this section monitors insurers' policy forms. See ALASKA STAT.
§ 21.42.120(a) (1993) (All insurance contracts must be filed with and approved by
the director of insurance.). It also performs market conduct exams of admitted
insurers and licensees and identifies financially impaired insurers. See ALASKA
ADMIN. CODE tit. 3, § 21.520(a)(1) (July 1993) (To identify financially impaired
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services, (6) law/enforcement' and (7) actuarial.m The director does not participate in the prosecution of matters that reach the
hearing stage, however, as insurance code violations are handled by
the Division's attorney in the law/enforcement section. While this
section has primary responsibility for investigating potential
violations, all personnel of the Division are available to assist it
with investigations of civil violations of the code. For example,
staff financial examiners assist with audit-related tasks, and market
analysts assist with market conduct exams. Both identify violations
of the insurance code.

insurers, the director may consider "findings reported in financial condition and
market conduct examination reports prepared by the division or another licensing
jurisdiction."). And, finally, it plays an important role in consumer protection, a
primary objective of insurance regulation. See Northern Adjusters, Inc. v. Dep't
of Revenue, 627 P.2d 205, 207 (Alaska 1981) (The purpose of the insurance code
"is to protect the Alaskan insurance consumer."). The director is required to
inform the public about their insurance rights and the availability of the agency's
services. ALASKA STAT. § 21.06.115 (1993). In May 1990, the Division published
the Insurance Consumer Guide, a publication designed to provide a general
overview of the different kinds of insurance available, as well as insurance
consumers' rights. See Cutting Through the Maze, ANCHORAGE TIMES, Oct. 8,

1990, at B4.
220. This section conducts financial examinations of insurance companies
applying for certificates of authority in Alaska, as well as examinations of persons
and companies other than insurers who are licensed by the Division. In addition,
it reviews insurers' annual financial statements and monitors the financial status
of insurers, both admitted and nonadmitted, that do business in the state. Current
eligible nonadmitted insurers are enumerated in the Division's Bulletin B93-11,
commonly referred to as the "white list." It is updated at least twice annually
pursuant to ALASKA STAT. § 21.34.050 (1993).

221. The attorneys assigned to work for the Division of Insurance are
employees of the Civil Division of the Attorney General's Office. In 1990, the
law/enforcement section had two attorneys working with it, which is a small
number compared to other states. 1991 NAIC RESOURCES REP., supra note 22,
at 6 (noting that in 1991, California's insurance department had 52 lawyers,
Florida's 36, New York's 39 and Texas' 38).
222. The newest section of the Division of Insurance, the actuarial section has
as its mission "to enforce statutory and regulatory rate and reserve standards for
insurers, and to inform the public about industry issues." ALASKA Div. OF INS.,
1992 STRATEGIC PLAN, at 10. The primary duties of this section involve reviewing
the rates charged by insurers and monitoring their solvency through periodic
examinations of their records. The increased pressure nationally for more effective
insurance regulation has resulted in increased reliance on actuaries.
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The scope of the Division's regulatory authority is broad,

encompassing power over "[a]ll persons' transactinge 4 a business of insurance' in this state, or relative to a subject resident,
located or to be performed in this state." 6 In fulfilling this
charge, the director of insurance has the right to subpoena both

223. "'Person' has the meaning given in A.S. § 01.10.060 and includes an
insurer, Lloyd's, fraternal benefit society, medical service or hospital service plan
as defined in A.S. § 21.87, reciprocal or interinsurance exchange, syndicate and any
other legal entity engaged in the business of transacting insurance, including
agents, brokers, and claims adjusters." ALASKA STAT. § 21.90.900(28) (1993).
224. "Transact" with respect to insurance is defined to include solicitation and
inducement, preliminary negotiations, effectuation of a contract of insurance and
the transaction of matters subsequent to effectuation of the contract of insurance
and arising out of it. Id. § 21.90.900(39). This is a broad definition. It includes
communications of any nature by which a person participates in the sale of an
insurance product. It also includes communications with a nexus to the claims
process or which facilitate an exchange of contractual consideration. Id.
225.
"Insurance" is defined as "a contract whereby one undertakes to
indemnify anotheror pay or provide a specified or determinable amount or benefit
upon determinable contingencies." Id. § 21.90.900(22) (emphasis added). Hence,
"self insurance" is not technically insurance at all, as it lacks the element of risk
transfer. Therefore, the insurance code, by way of the Division of Insurance, does
not regulate self-insurance. Cf id. §§ 21.33.061 (requiring self-insurers utilizing
excess loss, catastrophe or other insurance on risks in Alaska to file a report for
the purpose of determining premium taxes) & 21.55.140 (excluding certain selfinsurance from the state pooled health insurance plan). Like most states, Alaska
has traditionally provided for the use of self-insurance in the contexts of workers
compensation and motor vehicles. Id. §§ 23.30.045 (1990) & 28.20A00 (1989).
Recently, the Alaska legislature also addressed self-insurance with regard to oil
spill liability. Id. § 46.04.040 (Supp. 1993).
The use of self-insurance is increasing in our country. In1992 it accounted
for $46 billion in written premium equivalents. This represents 27% of companies'
risk management needs for property/casualty risks, as compared to 64% insured
through the conventional market (a 15% increase over 1991). See Alternative Risk
FinancingContinues to Gain Strength, BUS. INS., Jan. 25, 1993, at 3. As more and
more entities turn to self-insurance, there is a corresponding demand for stop-loss
insurance. This provides a cap on the self-insurance risk in the event of a
catastrophic loss or an inordinate number of claims. David Oliveri, Market to
Protect Self-Insured Firms Grows, BOSTON Bus. J., Dec. 21, 1992, at 5.
In addition, some guaranteed investment contracts (GICs), often purchased
as pension assets, may not technically be insurance due to the absence of a life
element. Even though the sale of the product may not be regulated, the insurer
can always be monitored for impaired financial condition that may result from the
purchase or sale of such products.
226. ALASKA STAT. § 21.03.010(a) (1993).
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records and testimony under oath,' and, like some other state
agencies, can also seek contempt sanctions from the superior court
in the event of non-compliance with a subpoena.' Since authorized insurers and licensees are required by the insurance code to
keep adequate records of their transactionsP 9 the subpoena
power gives the director a useful tool in enforcing record keeping
requirements. Furthermore, the subpoena power is an effective
means of obtaining documents and witness statements during the
course of an investigation, including medical records."0 The
subpoena power is a useful tool in combating insurance fraud.3 1
2. Examinations and Investigations. The insurance code
states that "[t]he director may conduct examinations and investigations of insurance matters, in addition to examinations and
investigations expressly authorized, considered proper to determine
whether any person has violated a provision of this title or to
secure information useful in the lawful administration of its
provisions." 2 "Examinations" refers to the examination of any
person or entity who is required to obtain permission from the
Division of Insurance prior to transacting the business of insurance.
Under Alaska Statutes section 21.06.120, the director is
authorized to "examine the affairs, transactions, accounts, records,
and assets of each authorized and formerly authorized insurer and
each licensed and formerly licensed managing general agent,
reinsurance intermediary broker, reinsurance intermediary
manager, surplus lines broker, and surplus lines association as often
as the director considers advisable." 3 In addition, Alaska
227. Md § 21.06.170(a).

228. Id. § 21.06.170(d).
229. Id. § 21.69.390(a); ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 3, § 21.460 (July 1993); see
also ALASKA STAT. § 21.21.350 (1993).
230. A health care provider should have no fear of incurring civil liability for

releasing records so long as the Division complies with Alaska Statutes section 21.06.170. Arnett v. Baskous, 856 P.2d 790, 792 (Alaska 1993) (holding that

a physician was not liable for releasing medical records pursuant to a valid
subpoena).
231. See generally ALASKA STAT. § 21.36.360 (1993) (fraudulent or criminal

insurance acts).
232. Id. § 21.06.080(c).
233. Id. § 21.06.120. The director's injunctive powers are also important and are
frequently used in enforcement actions. See id. §§ 21.22.065(b), (h) (unlawful
acquisition of insurance company); 21.27.405(b) (violation of licensing chapter);
21.36.320(c) (unfair trade practices).
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Statutes section 21.06.130 provides that "[t]o determine compliance
with this title, the director may as often as the director considers
advisable examine or require a written report from a person of the
accounts, records, documents, and transactions pertaining to or
affecting the insurance affairs or proposed insurance affairs" of an
insurance producer, independent adjuster, or person engaged in or
proposing to engage in the promotion or formation of a domestic
insurer or insurance holding corporation, or corporation to finance
For an
a domestic insurer or the production of its business.'
insurer, the examination typically takes place at its home office,
and for non-insurers at the location of their records?"
Examinations, which may be conducted under contract, result36
in a written report that is filed with the Division of Insurance
In most cases, the expenses of an examination, which can be
substantial, are passed on to the examinee3 7 The market surveillance and the financial examination sections are active participants
in examining insurance companies.
3. Sanctions. Sanctions can be characterized as either fines
or licensing actions. Although a general penalty provision provides
that any violation of the insurance code may be sanctioned through
a fine not to exceed $2500,"8 many chapters of the code have
their own penalty provisions.239 For example, under Alaska
Statutes section 21.09.260, ift after a hearing, the director finds that

234. Id. § 21.06.130.
235. Id. § 21.06.140(a).
236. Id. § 21.06.150(b).
237. Id § 21.06.160(a). The director has broad discretion to retain professionals
to conduct the examination. See id. § 21.06.140(d); see also id § 21.22.110(c)
(director given discretion in examining insurance holding company to retain
professionals at registered insurer's expense). Having the examinee pay expenses
is an old practice, and the territorial legislature required this as far back as 1937.
Act of Mar. 4, 1937, ch. 22, 1937 Alaska Sess. Laws 63 ("The expenses of an
examination into the affairs and condition of any insurance company or society
shall be borne by the company or society examined, unless remitted by the
Commissioner."). Legislative history for the 1966 revision reveals that, at the time,
the insurance industry supported this expense allocation device. HOUSE COM.
COMM. OF ALASKA, ALASKA INS. CODE, H.R. JOURNAL SuPP. No. 12, at 23 (Feb.
16, 1966).
238. ALASKA STAT. § 21.90.020 (1993).

239. E.g., id §§ 21.09.260 (authorized insurers), 21.27.440 (licenses), 21.33.065
(unauthorized insurers), 21.34.230 (surplus lines insurance), 21.39.160 (rates),
21.57.150 (credit insurance), 21.66.430 (title insurance) and 21.86.250 ("HMOs").
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an insurer engaged in a prohibited act, the insurer is subject to a
0
In
civil penalty of not more than $2500 for each violation.24
1992, penalties for violations of the licensing chapter were modified
to include:
(1) a civil penalty equal to the compensation promised, paid, or
to be paid, directly or indirectly, to a licensee in regard to each
violation;
(2) either a civil penalty of not more than $10,000 for each
violation or a civil penalty of not more than $25,000 for each
violation if the director determines that the person wilfully
violated the provisions of this chapter; and
(3) denial,
nonrenewal, suspension, or revocation of a li24 1
cense.

Civil fines are a common means of sanctioning insurance code
violations.242 While not punitive in nature, these sanctions fulfill
a variety of functions, including deterring the insurer or insurance
professionals such as applicants, respondent licensees or other
licensees from similar conduct.
The director has broad discretion to suspend or revoke an
insurer's license,24 3 as well as the license of an insurance profes-

240. Id. § 21.09.260.
241. Id. § 21.27.440.
242. Whether a formal administrative proceeding is commenced, imposition of
a fine must be pursuant to the director's order. If the fine is negotiated as part of
a settlement, the agreement must be adopted by order of the director. The order
must specify the time period within which the fine must be fully paid, a period not
less than 15 days nor more than one year after the date of the order. In the 1992
Omnibus Bill, the legislature acknowledged the importance of licensing sanctions
by providing that the failure to pay a fine when due provides a basis for revocation
of all licenses not already revoked, without a hearing. Id. § 21.27.440(b); see also
Bankers Life & Casualty Co. v. Alexander, 45 N.W.2d 258, 263 (Iowa 1950)
(Statutes "regulating the insurance business are remedial in character, enacted
under the state's police power upon the theory the business is impressed with a
public interest and the public is entitled to protection against illegal practices.");
State v. O'Neill Investigations, Inc., 609 P.2d 520, 528 (Alaska 1980).
243. ALASKA STAT. § 21.09.150 (1993). In some instances, the director is
required to suspend or revoke an insurer's license. Id. § 21.09.140. The Alaska
Supreme Court has characterized the director's discretionary powers as follows:
In matters of occupational licensure the decision to initiate proceedings
for revocation or suspension is comparable to the function of a public
prosecutor in deciding whether to file a complaint. Questions of law and
fact, of policy, of practicality, and of the allocation of an agency's
resources all come into play in making such a decision. The weighing of
these elements is the very essence of what is meant when one speaks of
an agency exercising its discretion.
Vick v. Bd. of Elec. Examiners, 626 P.2d 90, 93 (Alaska 1981).
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sional. There are numerous grounds for denial, nonrenewal,
suspension or revocation of licenses. For insurance professionals,
examples of conduct which could jeopardize a party's license
include, among other things, misrepresentation in the license
application, any violation of a provision of the insurance code,
misuse of money held in a fiduciary capacity, and intentional
misrepresentation of the terms or effect of an insurance policy.'
Finally, since licenses are granted to firms as well as individuals, the
license of a firm and its principal or manager may be jeopardized
if
illegal
actions are undertaken by a person acting on behalf of the
24 5
finm.
Trustworthiness is an important consideration in determining
whether to grant a license under the insurance code.2" The code
expressly provides that license applicants must be trustworthy.247
In accordance with Alaska Statutes section 21.27.040, license
applicants must "declare under penalty of denial, nonrenewal,
suspension, or revocation of a license issued by the director that the
statements made in or in connection with the application are true,
correct, and complete to the best of the applicant's knowledge and
belief" 2" And, Alaska Statutes section 21.27.410(a)(8) provides
that denial, nonrenewal, suspension, or revocation of a license may
be based on the director's determination that the conduct or affairs

244. ALASKA STAT. § 21.27.410(a) (1993).
245. Id. § 21.27.410(b).
246. Research reveals no published Alaska cases addressing denial of an
insurance license based on untrustworthiness. Other cases throughout the country,

however, overwhelmingly reflect the appropriateness of denying or revoking a
license for untrustworthiness. E.g., Taylor v. Montgomery, 413 A.2d 923 (D.C.

1980) (insurance solicitor's license application denied due to untrustworthiness);
Department of Ins. v. Hendrickson, 196 N.E.2d 574 (Ind.1964) (omission of arrest
in application of bail bondsman showed untrustworthiness); McKie v. Corcoran,
556 N.Y.S.2d 732 (1990) (insurance broker's license revoked due to
untrustworthiness and refusal to cooperate in investigation); Bartholomew v. State
of N.Y. Ins. Dep't, 469 N.Y.S.2d 219 (1983) (insurance broker's license application
denied due to untrustworthiness).

247. ALAsKA STAT. § 21.27.020(a) (1993).
248. Id. § 21.27.040(a). In 1992, the Division of Insurance joined other states
that require an applicant for a license to sign a sworn Authorization and Release.
This document authorizes the disclosure of educational records, work history

records, and records of other insurance regulatory agencies and allows the Division
to more easily investigate the applicant's moral character, professional reputation,
and fitness for licensure.
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Finally, the statutes

allow inquiry into the truth or falsity of facts included in an
application at any time."
The Division is obligated to report to the NAIC enforcement
proceedings involving licenses applied for or issued. Because the
matter will then become accessible to other insurance regulatory
agencies via computer linkup, the consequences of untruthfulness
go beyond Alaska.
4. Hearings. Hearings involving the Division of Insurance
may be held for a wide variety of reasons. General statutory
authority gives the director discretion to "hold hearings for any

purpose within the scope of this title considered to be necessary."'" The director must hold a hearing "if required by a
provision of this title, or upon written demand by a person
aggrieved by an act, threatened act, or failure of the director to act,
or by a report, regulation, or order of the director." 2
Alaska Statutes sections 21.06.170-.240 provide the hearing
mechanism for enforcement proceedings. 3 While not required
under the code, as a matter of convention, Alaska's Administrative
Procedure Act ("APA") z" is followed for nearly all hearings
involving the Division of Insurance.25 The convenience factor
249. Id. § 21.27.410(a)(8). The Omnibus Bill contains a new requirement that
a licensee must notify the director within 30 days of a suspension or revocation of
a license by another state, or a conviction of any misdemeanor or felony. Id.
§ 21.27.025(a). The failure to comply with this requirement reflects an applicant's
untrustworthiness.
250. Id. § 21.27.410(a)(1).
251. Id. § 21.06.180(a).
252. Id. § 21.06.180(b). E.g., id. §§ 21.27A05 (licensing) & 21.36.320 (unfair
trade practices). The 1992 Omnibus Bill changed Alaska Statutes section 21.06.150
so that a hearing is no longer required prior to the finalization of an examination
report. Id. § 21.06.150(b).
253. Id. §§ 21.06.170-.240. These provisions are referred to in other areas of the
code. See, e.g., id. §§ 21.09.175 (order affecting financially impaired insurer),
21.09.260 (insurer engaged in prohibited act) & 21.22.170 (insurer violating
Insurance Company Holding Act). Two notable exceptions to hearing procedures
are rate hearings and hearings pertaining to the newly created Comprehensive
Health Insurance Association. The former does not have an opportunity for
hearing officer involvement, while the latter is expressly exempt from Alaska's
Administrative Procedure Act. Id. §§ 21.06.240, 21.39.170, 21.55.050.
254. Id. §§ 44.62.330-.630.
255. Id. § 44.62.330(a), (b). The Division of Insurance has never been listed as
one of the state agencies subject to APA procedures for administrative adjudica-
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weighs heavily in this decision. Hearing officers who handle
Division of Insurance matters also handle hearings for the Division
of Occupational Licensing, which is required to follow APA
procedures for administrative adjudication. 6 Additionally, APA
procedures provide a familiar framework for both the hearing
officers' and the Division of Insurance in an area in which there
is otherwise no guidance. The director of insurance, however,
probably has discretion to not follow the APA.
At an APA hearing, the Alaska Rules of Civil Procedure
control discovery and evidentiary rulings, though the Rules of
Evidence are substantially relaxed. For example, a certified copy
of any document from the files of the Division of Insurance will be
admissible at a hearinge s and hearsay evidence may be admitted
into the record. 9 The APA also allows admission of affidavits
20
into evidence in place of testimony under certain circumstances.
At the hearing, the party with the burden of going forward will
generally present its case first. The hearing officer has discretion
to allow the parties to present their cases in reverse order if they
agree, or if the convenience of witnesses necessitates it. The party
asserting the affirmative side of an issue bears the burden of
proottf " and the preponderance of the evidence standard generally applies at a hearing. 2 For some violations, the code requires

tion. In contrast, when promulgating regulations, the APA procedures apply to
all state agencies. Id. § 44.62.040(a).
256. See id. § 44.62.330(a) (listing boards that comprise the Division of
Occupational Licensing).
257. The hearing officer is an employee of the Department of Commerce and

Economic Development, not the Division of Insurance. As a matter of practice,
prior to the hearing officer's decision, there is no communication about a case
between the director and the hearing officer.
258. ALAsKA STAT. § 21.06.070(a) (1993).
259. "Hearsay evidence may be used to supplement or explain direct evidence

but is not sufficient by itself to support a finding unless it would be admissible
over objection in a civil action." Id, § 44.62.460(d).
260. Id. § 44.62.470.
261. See Alaska Alcoholic Beverage Control Bd. v. Malcolm, Inc., 391 P.2d 441,
444 (Alaska 1964). Thus, one seeking to change the status quo has the burden of
proof, which is particularly important in a matter involving the initial denial of a
license, where the applicant has the burden to establish that the director's decision
was arbitrary, capricious and beyond his discretion. Alaska Alcoholic Beverage
Control Bd. v. Decker, 700 P.2d 483, 485 (Alaska 1985).
262. See Amerada Hess Pipeline Corp. v. Alaska Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 711 P.2d
1170, 1179 n.14 (Alaska 1986).
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that the Division also prove the willfulness of an action.2' The
doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel apply to administrative proceedings involving the Division.2'
Parties in such hearings, with the hearing officer's permission,
may submit closing arguments in writing. In the hearing officer's
discretion, it may also be possible to supplement the record for
good cause after the hearing. After the record is closed and all
briefs have been submitted, the hearing officer must prepare a
written decision which includes findings of fact, a determination of
the issues presented, and the proposed penalty, if any.265 The
director, however, has discretion to adopt or reject the opinion and
may choose either to decide the case by himself based on the
record, with or without taking additional evidence, or refer the case
to the same or another hearing officer to take additional evidence. 6 In the latter situation, a new proposed decision must be
prepared. If the director decides the case himself, the parties must
be given the opportunity to present either oral or written argument. 7
Parties subject to an order of the director may appeal as of
right to the superior court.2 The court will review the factual
findings based on the substantial evidence standard.269 The
application of the law to particular factual circumstances is
committed to the sound discretion of the director, and the scope of
review is limited to whether the decision was arbitrary, unreasonOf course, the discretionary
able or an abuse of discretion.
263. E.g., ALASKA STAT. §§ 21.22.170, 21.27.410(a)(2) & (3), 21.39.160 and
21.57.150 (1993).
264. McKean v. Municipality of Anchorage, 783 P.2d 1169,1171 (Alaska 1989).
265. Id.§ 44.62.510. The failure to include findings of fact constitutes an abuse
of discretion. Manthey v. Collier, 367 P.2d 884, 889 (Alaska 1962).
266. ALASKA STAT. § 44.62.500(c) (1993).
267. Id.
268. Id. §§ 21.06.230, 44.62.560; see also ALASKA R. APP. P. 602. Courts take
a broad view of what constitutes a final administrative order from which the 30
day period to appeal lies. See Manning v. Alaska R.R. Corp., 853 P.2d 1120
(Alaska 1993).
269. "Under this standard, the reviewing court does not reweigh the evidence
or choose between competing inferences; it only determines whether such evidence
exists. Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Storrs v. State Medical Bd., 664 P.2d
547, 554 (Alaska 1983) (citation omitted).
270. Rose v. Commercial Fisheries Entry Comm'n, 647 P.2d 154, 161 (Alaska
1982). "To demonstrate an abuse of discretion, the appellant must show that the
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doctrines of primary jurisdiction2 ' and exhaustion of administrative remedies' may apply to preclude a party from prematurely
fees incurred at an
seeking relief from the courts. And, attorney's
administrative hearing are not recoverable. 3
V.

CONCLUSION

It takes a well-funded and adequately staffed regulatory agency
to keep abreast of the financial condition and activities of the over
1000 admitted insurance companies in Alaska. The legislature
requires that insurer insolvencies be prevented whenever possible,
and not dealt with strictly through crisis managementY4 Similarly, with over 6000 licensees, only a well-funded and sufficiently
staffed Division of Insurance can fulfill its charge of disciplining
insurance code violations by those agents, brokers and adjusters
that may put the property of Alaska insureds at risk. Consumers
expect the insurance professional handling their money to be
properly licensed and competent just as they would a doctor,
architect, attorney, engineer or investment broker. Unlicensed and
unauthorized insurance activity is taken seriously by Alaska's
Division of Insurance. Blatant disregard for licensing procedures
can result in denial of a license applied for or revocation of an
existing license, in addition to a substantial fine.275

If there ever were days in Alaska when a party subject to
sanction by the Division could secure the equivalent of a "slap on
the wrist" after an informal meeting with the director, they have
passed. This is not to suggest that the Division's enforcement
procedure is unfair. On the contrary, it is flexible when necessary
in accordance with the discretion given the director. Indeed, the
Division's enforcement mechanism is probably more fair today than
in the past due to more formalized procedures that create a level
playing field for insurers and licensees. The 1992 Strategic Plan
agency decision was an 'expression of whim rather than an exercise of judgment."'
Johns v. Commercial Fisheries Entry Comm'n, 758 P.2d 1256, 1265 (Alaska 1988)

(quoting American Tel. & Tel. Co. v. United States, 299 U.S. 232,236-37 (1936)).
271. State v. Zia, Inc., 556 P.2d 1257, 1262 (Alaska 1976).
272. Standard Alaska Prod. Co. v. Department of Revenue, 773 P.2d 201,206-

10 (Alaska 1989).
273. Stepanov v. Homer Elec. Ass'n, 814 P.2d 731, 737 (Alaska 1991); State v.
Smith, 593 P.2d 625, 630-31 (Alaska 1979).

274. See generally ALASKA STAT. §§ 21.09.175, 21.78.010-.330 (1993); ALASKA
ADMIN. CODE tit. 3, §§ 21.510-.520 (July 1993).
275. See supra notes 240-241 and accompanying text.
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prepared by the current Director states: "We are, by law, insulated
from certain types of 'political' pressure and are charged with
regulating the insurance industry in the state in a professional,
nonpartisan manner. ' 2 6
Finall3 lest one be overly optimistic about the capabilities of
the Division of Insurance, there are some obvious limitations even
with a well-funded and adequately staffed agency. Uninsurability
of certain risks that are societal problems, uncertainties real or
perceived with the judicial system, and rapidly fluctuating interest
rates leading to cyclical insurance underwriting are examples of
circumstances that can not be significantly affected by insurance
regulators.' Insurance cycles, like economic cycles generally, are
a continuing phenomena that can be expected to repeat. 278
Insurance regulation has come a long way from the days of
essentially self-regulation when insurers merely filed forms and data
with ex-officio regulators or legislatures. The regulation process
today is complex with potentially far-reaching consequences for
national and global economies. As a result, insurance regulatory
issues are gaining increased attention from public policy makers
across the country both at the state and federal levels. While the
NAIC's accreditation program appears to be maintaining the status
quo for state regulation in this area, the congressional focus on
insurance regulation can be expected to continue, particularly given
recent national problems with other financial institutions.
Insurance regulatory agencies are unique. No other state
agency regulates financial institutions on a national and international scale. Nor is there another state agency that so heavily relies on
the activities of other states' regulatory agencies. Through the
NAIC, data collected by insurance regulators is shared on a
national basis.
Regulatory authority over insurance is among the last few
powers of government remaining nearly exclusively to the states,
and Alaska has vigorously exercised its prerogative in this field. In

276. ALASKA DIVISION OF INSURANCE, 1992 STRATEGIC PLAN 19.

277. See generally DONALD S. BREAKSTONE ET AL., A.B.A. TORT & INS.
(1989) (intimating that

PRAC. SEC, CUSHIONING AGAINST INSURANCE CYCLES

insurance cycles are inevitable).
278. Id. at 1 ("Crises, represented by high, perhaps ridiculously high premium
rates and/or the unavailability of needed coverage, as well as advantageous market

cycles, represented by low, perhaps exceedingly low, premium rates and/or market
excess capacity, will be seen again.").
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the interest of protecting Alaska insurance consumers, there must
be a continuing recognition of the necessity for vigorous oversight
of this important industry. Adequate support from the legislature,
both through funding and the enactment of laws, is essential so that
the Division can maintain a consistent philosophy by which to
effectively balance consumers' needs with those of insurers and
producers. Alaska's director of insurance has broad discretion to
regulate the insurance industry pursuant to the insurance code.
That discretion, coupled with the active and well-staffed enforcement mechanism resulting from the recent NAIC accreditation,
should benefit Alaska insurance consumers.

